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Access to the Printed Media by Political Candidates:
Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo
Plaintiff was seeking election to the Florida House of Representatives and
defendant newspaper editorially attacked his candidacy. Plaintiff asked the
newspaper to print his reply to the editorial. When the newspaper refused,
plaintiff sought an injunction to compel it to publish the response, basing his
suit on Florida's "right of reply" statute1 which allowed a political candidate
the right to answer, free of charge, newspaper articles critical of his candi-
dacy. The Florida circuit court ruled that the reply statute was unconstitu-
tional as it infringed on the freedom of the press.2 On appeal the Florida
Supreme Court reversed and upheld the statute.3 The newspaper appealed
to the United States Supreme Court. Held, reversed: Florida's "right of
reply" statute unduly intrudes into the discretion of newspaper editors in de-
termining content for publication and, therefore, violates the first amendment
guarantee of a free press. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1974).
I. A CHANGING COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Con-
gress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, free-
dom of speech and of the press are protected from abridgment by the states.5
Though first amendment rights stand "in a preferred position,"6 forming the
foundation of all our civil and political institutions,7 the 'United States Su-
preme Court has never interpreted the first 'amendment as an absolute re-
straint on Congress or the states. s
At a minimum, the first amendment, as enacted in 1791, meant that every
freeman should have the right to publish and distribute any materials he
desired without having to procure a license. 9 The first amendment was also
1. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (1973).
2. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 38 Fla. Supp. 80 (Cir. Ct. 1972).
3. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
6. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
7. See Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
8. There are two principal areas where the Court has not considered the first
amendment an absolute restraint. First, the right of free speech and press ceases where
it presents a clear and present danger to the government. See, e.g., Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-29 (1961); Communist Party of the United States v. Subver-
sive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 88-105 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 502-11 (1951); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Second,
obscene material is not protected by the first amendment. See, e.g., Kaflan v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 115, 120 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); United
States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376-77 (1971); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
9. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
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designed to ensure that the press should be free from any other form of pre-
vious restraint, especially that of prior censorship. 10 Today, however, our
means of communication are not limited to that of the conventional press of
1791. Most dramatic of the changes in the communications media is the
development of the broadcast industry" which falls within the general protec-
tion of the first amendment. 12 Moreover, the characteristics of the printed
media itself have changed in the past two hundred years. 13 Entry into the
publishing industry was relatively inexpensive in 1791, whereas today the
daily newspaper industry is characterized by conglomerates 14 and is limited
to those with large capital fortunes.' 5
IL. A RIGHT OF AcCESS VERSUS FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
As a result of changes in both the means and characteristics of communica-
tion, many have been led to question the proper structure' 6 and purpose of
the entire communications media and suggest appropriate revisions. The
most controversial of the answers is the proposal providing for a first amend-
ment right of access.' 7 Premised on the assumption that those individuals
who control the communications industry are the actual sources of suppres-
sion and censorship in America,' the proponents of access have concluded
that unless some form of access to the media is established tha public will
have lost its ability to participate effectively in debate on issues of public
importance. 19 Accordingly, this proposal would interpret the first amend-
ment not only as supplying a traditional restraint on government, but also
as granting an affirmative right of access by the public to the communica-
tions media.
A limited form of access to the broadcast media was held constitutional
10. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), in which the Court deter-
mined that a state statute which permanently enjoined the publishing and distribution
of newspapers containing scandalous or defamatory material was unconstitutional. The
remedy is for those persons defamed to bring proceedings under the libel laws rather
than restrain publication of the newspapers. Id. at 719.
11. For an in-depth discussion of the changing communications media and the role
of government, see 2 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1965).
12. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
13. For an excellent summary of the changes which have taken place in the printed
media, see Note, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 867,
891-902 (1972).
14. A. BALK, BACKGROUND PAPER, TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE REPORT
FOR A NATIONAL NEws COUNCIL, A FREE AND RESPONSIVE PRESS 18 (1973).
15. "[I]t would be virtually impossible for a competitor to enter the [daily news-
paper industry] due to the financial exigencies of this era." Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 159 (1973) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TExAS L. REv. 766, 772
(1970).
16. J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973); Barron, Access-The
Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TExAs L. REV. 766 (1970); Barron, An Emerging First
Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969); Barron,
Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 -Av. L. REv. 1641 (1967);
Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Criti-
cal Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1973).
17. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REv.
1641 (1967).




by the United States Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.20
The specific access provision tested was the fairness doctrine, which requires
broadcasters to present discussion of public issues on their stations while 'en-
suring that each side of those issues receives fair coverage.21 In Red Lion
an author was criticized during a radio program discussing his newly released
book.22  The author asked the radio station to allow him to reply, free of
charge, on the basis of the personal attacks clause of the fairness doctrine.23
The FCC held that free reply time should be granted -the author 24 and the
Supreme Court upheld the ruling.25 In justifying its decision, the Supreme
Court relied on the theory of the limited availability of broadcast stations, 20
and emphasized that legislation affirmatively providing for access to the
broadcast media "enhance[d] rather than abridge[d] the freedoms of speech
and press protected by the First Amendment. '27  In supporting a limited
form of access to the broadcast media the Court noted that it is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the broadcasters, which is of chief impor-
tance. 28 The Court further stated that the first amendment does not sanction
private censorship in a communications medium not open to everyone 29 any-
more than it sanctions government censorship. In summary, the fairness
doctrine was held not to abridge freedom of speech and press since it maxi-
mizes opportunities for expression.30
The hope that the decision in Red Lion could be applied to newspapers
was strengthened by the Supreme Court's decision in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Human Relations Commission.3 ' The Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations complained 'that the defendant newspaper was using an advertising
20. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
21. The fairness doctrine developed early in a long series of rulings by the FCC.
See Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). It was approved by
Congress in the 1959 amendments to the Federal Communications Act. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(a) (Supp. 1974). See generally Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the
Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10416 (1964).
22. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Red Lion does not adequately relate the
facts, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 910-17 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
23. The personal attacks rule is a sub-part of the fairness doctrine, which requires
that whenever a broadcast personally attacks an individual or organization, the broadcast
licensee must notify the person or group of the broadcast and transmit to the person
or group a copy of the text of the broadcast no later than one week after the attack,
along with an offer of his station's facilities for an adequate reply. See 47 C.F.R.
§§ 73.123, .300, .598, .679 (1973) (all identical).
24. The author complained to the FCC that the station had broadcast a personal
attack on his character without notifying him of the attack and without sending him
a copy of the text of the program. The Commission then notified the station of the
complaint and requested an answer within 20 days. After an exchange of several letters
between the radio station and the Commission, the Commission notified the station that
it must give the author free broadcast time to reply. 381 F.2d at 911-17.
25. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
26. This theory was originally expressed in National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), where the Court stated that since the facilities of radio
are not available to all who may desire to use them, regulation is necessary to control
the development of radio and ensure its efficient operation in accordance with the "pub.
lic interest." Id. at 212-18.
27. 395 U.S. at 375.
28. Id. at 390.
29. Id. at 392. See also Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, supra note 21, at
1257.
30. See Barron, supra note 15, at 770.
31. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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layout that subdivided employment opportunities into categories designating
job preference by sex.8 2 Contending that such categorization violated a city
ordinance forbidding any advertising that indicated sex discrimination"3 the
commission issued a cease-and-desist order. In upholding the commission's
cease-and-desist order and barring the defendant newspaper from indicating
sex preference in its advertising section, the Supreme Court relied on Valen-
tine v. Chrestensen34 where a unanimous Court had held that the first
amendment does not apply to purely commercial advertising. 35 Admitting
that the city ordinance did tell the newspaper editors how to arrange the con-
tents of their paper, the Court stated that any first amendment rights were
outweighed by the illegality of the commercial activity.3 6 Despite the com-
mercial advertising theory, Pittsburgh Press stands as "the first case [al-
lowing] a government agency to . . . dictate to the publisher the layout
and makeup of the newspaper's pages."'3 7
While the combination of Red Lion and Pittsburgh Press provided a foun-
dation for a limited form of access to the printed media, that foundation was
weakened somewhat by the Supreme Court's decision in Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee."8 When a broad-
casting station refused to carry a paid political advertisement, the Democratic
National Committee brought suit to compel the station to broadcast it. Re-
jecting the argument that the refusal to carry the advertisement was a viola-
tion of the first amendment, the Supreme Court stated that Congress did not
intend the fairness doctrine to mean that the broadcast media must serve as
a common carrier giving every person a direct right of access to speak out
on public issues. 39
Ill. MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING CO. v. TORNILLO
In Tornillo the Supreme Court held Florida's "right of reply" statute un-
constitutional as a prior restraint on the press. 40 There is no difference, ac-
cording to the Court, between censoring newspaper content and telling news-
paper editors what they must print. Although the Court viewed a respon-
sible press as being desirable, it found nothing in the Constitution requiring
the press to be responsible. 41 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court,
considered a right of access 42 to newspapers as contrary to the opinion in
Democratic National Committee43 in which it was noted that while a broad-
cast licensee's programming is subject to regulation under the Communica-
32. Id. at 397.
33. Id. at 379-80.
34. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
35. Id. at 54.
36. 413 U.S. at 389.
37. Id. at 402 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
38. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
39. Id. 103-14.
40. 418 U.S. at 256.
41. id.
42. The Court treated the question of Tornillo as a general right of access for ev-
eryone, not just candidates for election.
43. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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tions Act, 44 newspaper content is a product of the editors' "journalistic integ-
rity" and not government fiat.45 The Court was not willing to expand inter-
ference into the organization of a newspaper's pages beyond the peculiar facts
of Pittsburgh Press.46
It is significant that the opinion in Tornillo did not mention the holding
in Red Lion47 since the facts supporting the rationale for a limited right of
access are stronger in Tornillo than in Red Lion. Just as it was the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the broadcasters, that was paramount in Red
Lion,48 it would seem to follow that it is the right of the readers, not the
newspaper publishers, that is protected by the first amendment. 49  If the first
amendment does not protect private censorship in the broadcast media,50
neither should such be protected in the printed media. 51
Moreover, since private censorship is equated with limited entry into a
communications media,52 the problem seems more acute in the newspaper
industry,53 for there are far more broadcasting stations than newspapers in
the United States.5 4 Democratic National Committee explained limited
entry into the broadcast media in terms of the "inherent physical limita-
tion[s]" 55 of the airwaves, resulting in a need for government licensing. The
economic barriers to entry into the printed media, however, are even more
forbidding.56 ,Furthermore, while the physical limitations of the broadcast
media seem to be dissipating with such technological advancements as cable
television, 57 the same cannot be said of the economic barriers in the printed
media.5s Finally, if a limited right of access in the broadcast media (the
fairness doctrine) maximizes opportunities for expression and thereby en-
hances first -amendment rights,59 it would inevitably follow that Florida's
"right of reply" statute enhances first amendment rights.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged differing first amendment standards
in the treatment of the broadcast media and the printed media. 60  Yet,
applying either the limited entry theory or the maximization of opportunities
for expression theory of Red Lion to the facts in Tornillo, the results in the
two cases seem ,to indicate the application of differing first amendment stand-
44. 412 U.S. at 117-18.
45. 418 U.S. at 255.
46. Id.; see notes 31-37 supra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 20-29 supra and accompanying text.
48. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
49. 2 Z. CRAFEE, supra note 11, at 546.
50. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
51. Barron, supra note 15, at 767.
52. 395 U.S. at 389.
53. 418 U.S. at 249 n.13.
54. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
144 nn. 13-14 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); Barron, supra note 15, at 773; Com-
ment, Constitutional Law: The Right of Access to the Press, 50 NEB. L. REV. 120, 133
(1971).
55. 412 U.S. at 101.
56. Id. at 159 (Douglas, J., concurring).
57. See Note, supra note 13, at 970-72; accord, Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc.
v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 75-76 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 922 (1973); Barron, supra note 15, at 780.
58. See Barron, supra note 15, at 772; Note, supra note 13, at 895-96.
59. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
60. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
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ards without any sound justification. The characteristics of the broadcast
media that furnished a basis for upholding the fairness doctrine are equally
present in the printed media. The Supreme Court seems to have more faith
in the journalistic integrity of newspaper editors than it does broadcasters.
IV. CONCLUSION
The first amendment was enacted out of fear that liberty of the press
would be endangered as soon as the government attempted to control the
contents of newspapers.61 Essentially, the idea was to leave the newspapers
free to discuss public issues and public officials. The first amendment, as
originally interpreted, did not require that discussion to be fair or representa-
tive of both sides.62 Tornillo supports the original intent of the first amend-
ment.
The first amendment interpretation in Red Lion, however, is inconsistent
with that in Tornillo. While licensing is necessary in the broadcast industry
because of the limited availability of broadcast frequencies, government inter-
ference should be limited to the assignment of wavelengths and the promotion
of technological developments that will open up new broadcasting channels.63
As to editing, either by government censorship or compelling the broadcasting
of certain issues through access provisions, the broadcast industry should be
put on the same footing as the printed media is in Tornillo. While deregula-
tion of the broadcast media is unlikely,6 4 the inconsistent treatment of the
broadcast media and printed media will become more acute as scarcity of
airwaves disappears in the former, and economic barriers to entry remain in
the latter.
David R. Norton
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: Defamation and Freedom
of the Press-The Struggle Continues
Plaintiff, a prominent attorney, had represented the victim's family in a
civil suit against a Chicago policeman previously convicted of murdering their
son. The defendant published an allegedly defamatory article in its monthly
magazine, American Opinion, which is operated as an outlet for the views
of the John Birch Society. The article stated that the plaintiff was a "Len-
inist" and a "Communist-fronter," who had orchestrated a frame-up of the
policeman in the criminal action. Further, the article implied that the plain-
tiff had been involved in illegal activities during the 1968 Democratic con-
61. 2 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 11, at 633. See also New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
62. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 719-20 (1931).
63. 412 U.S. at 157-58 (Douglas, J., concurring).
64. Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw &
ECoN. 15, 30 (1967).
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vention. The plaintiff instituted his libel action against the defendant in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district
court entered a judgment non obstante veredicto for the defendant on the
grounds that the discussion of any public issue, regardless of the status of
the person involved, is privileged unless there is a showing of actual malice
in the publication.' The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 2  The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed and remanded: The
states may develop appropriate standards of liability for publishing defama-
tory falsehoods regarding private individuals, so long as liability is not
imposed without fault. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L.
Ed 2d 789 (1974).
I. THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
The present web of defamation law is the product of an illogical and mer-
curial common law development.3  Today, defamation is generally under-
stood to mean that which tends to injure reputation in the popular sense; to
diminish the esteem, respect, good will, or confidence in which the plaintiff
is held. 4  The two branches of defamation are libel and slander. Libel is
a malicious written publication 5 tending to disparage the memory of one who
is dead, or the reputation of one who is alive, and expose him to public ha-
tred, contempt, or ridicule.6 On the other hand, slander is the publication
of defamatory matters by the spoken word.7
Courts make further distinctions based on evidentiary differences between
libel per se and libel per quod. The former is a Written publication which
is indisputably actionable on its face without the aid of extrinsic evidence.8
1. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1970). The Court
held that even though the plaintiff had (1) a following in the press and the media, (2)
written books, articles, and reviews, (3) made public speeches and radio and television
appearances, and (4) been a civic leader, he was not a public figure. However, since
the murder trial of the Chicago policeman was of public interest, the plaintiff would
have to show actual malice in the defendant's publication in order to establish liability.
2. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972). The majority
doubted that the plaintiff was not a public figure, but held that New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), was controlling as the article involved a matter of public con-
cern. Since the plaintiff had not proven actual malice in the defendant's publication,
the Court sustained the findings of the trial court.
3. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 111 (4th ed. 1971); Carr, The English Law
of Defamation: With Especial Reference to the Distinction Between Libel and Slander,
18 L.Q. REV. 255 (1902); Donnelly, History of Defamation, 24 WIs. L. REv. 99 (1949).
4. Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1973); Williams v. Gulf Coast Collec-
tion Agency Co., 493 S.W.2d 367 (Mo. 1973); Farnsworth v. Hyde, 512 P.2d 1003
(Ore. 1973).
5. Publication is a legal word of art meaning communication. Burney v. Southern
Ry., 276 Ala. 637, 165 So. 2d 726 (1964); Lewis v. Readers Digest Ass'n Inc., 512 P.2d
702 (Mont. 1973); Emo v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 183 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1971).
6. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Viera v. Kwik Homes Serv.,
Inc., 263 La. 368, 266 So. 2d 732, writ denied, 268 So. 2d 258 (1972); Burke v. Tri-
angle Publications, Inc., 225 Pa. Super. 272, 302 A.2d 408 (1973).
7. Pierce v. Burns, 55 Del. 166, 185 A.2d 477 (1962); Beane v. Weiman Co., 5
N.C. App. 276, 168 S.E.2d 236 (1969); Butler v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d
510 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970), error dismissed.
8. Gomba v. McLaughlin, 30 Colo. App. 315, 493 P.2d 684, rev'd, 504 P.2d 337
(1972) (defendant charged plaintiff with an act which would have made him subject
of odium); Harwood v. Bush, 223 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1969) (allegory printed in newspaper
about plaintiff); McCuddin v. Dickinson, 226 Iowa 304, 283 N.W. 886 (1939) (ad in
newspaper addressed to plaintiff stating "I don't think that you can tell the truth on or
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However, where extrinsic evidence is necessary to prove the defamatory pub-
lication, it is termed libel per quod.9 The importance of the distinction lies
in the fact that a majority of the states hold that in cases of libel per se dam-
age to the plaintiff is conclusively presumed. 10  In cases of libel per quod
or slander the plaintiff must either prove special damages,1 or show that the
defamation relates to (1) a crime involving moral turpitude,' 2 (2) a loath-
some disease,1" (3) the plaintiff's business or trade,14 or (4) the unchastity
of a woman."
In all defamation cases the plaintiff must show that the words of the de-
fendant were in fact communicated to a party other than the plaintiff, 16 that
the words were understood in a defamatory sense,' 7 and that the defamatory
off the witness stand."); Rose v. Koch, 278 Minn. 235, 154 N.W.2d 409 (1967) (state-
ment in defendant's newspaper that the plaintiff was a Communist-fronter); Reed v.
Melnick, 31 N.M. 608, 471 P.2d 178 (1970) (defendant's letter stated, in reference to
the plaintiff, "People can't get any money out of him."); McGaw v. Webster, 79 N.M.
104, 440 P.2d 296 (1968) (defendant published that plaintiff was a Communist).
9. Interstate Detective Bureau, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 29 Colo. App. 313, 484
P.2d 131 (1971) (article printed by defendant about a theft which did not identify the
plaintiff by name); Danias v. Fakis, 261 A.2d 529 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969) (defendant's
charge that plaintiff informed federal immigration authorities of suspected illegal alien,
did not, on its face, constitute an illegal act); Robinson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 273 N.C.
391, 159 S.E.2d 896 (1968) (defendant's letter which stated that plaintiff's automobile
insurance had been cancelled because of his personal habits, was not obviously defama-
tory); Redding v. Carlton, 223 Pa. Super. 136, 296 A.2d 880 (1972) (defendant's letter
that plaintiff's dual role as property owner and township supervisor constituted a con-
flict of interest was held not to be actionable without extrinsic proof); Brown v. Na-
tional Home Ins. Co., 239 S.C. 488, 123 S.E.2d 850 (1962) (letter from plaintiff de-
manding payment from defendant); Western States Title Ins. Co. v. Warnock, 18 Utah
2d 70, 415 P.2d 316 (1966) (letter by defendant which used phrase "slander of title"
with regard to plaintiff's property, was not libelous on its face, as it was sent to non-
attorney).
10. Myers v. Mobile Press-Register, Inc., 266 Ala. 508, 97 So. 2d 819 (1957); Far-
num v. Colbert, 293 A.2d 279 (D.C. App. 1972); Reed v. Melnick, 81 N.M. 608, 471
P.2d 178 (1970); Williams v. Rutherford Freight Lines, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 384, 179
S.E.2d 319 (1971); Beecher v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 517 P.2d 667 (Ore. 1973);
Waechter v. Carnation Co., 5 Wash. App. 121, 485 P.2d 1000 (1971).
11. Libel per quod: Piver v. Hoberman, 220 So. 2d 408 (Fla. App. 1969); Haynes
v. Alverno Heights Hosp., 515 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1973); Barrett v. Barrett, 108 R.I. 15,
271 A.2d 825 (1970). Slander: Gurtler v. Union Parts Mfg. Co., 1 N.Y.2d 5, 132
N.E.2d 889, 150 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1956); Oston v. Hallock, 55 Wis. 2d 687, 201 N.W.2d 35
(1972).
12. Munafo v. Helfand, 140 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Roscoe v. Schoolitz, 105
Ariz. 310, 464 P.2d 333 (1970); Pierce v. Burns, 5 Del. 166, 185 A.2d 477 (1962);
Rhodes v. Star Herald Printing Co., 173 Neb. 496, 113 N.W.2d 658, cert. denied, 371
U.S. 822 (1962).
13. Modla v. Parker, 17 Ariz. App. 54, 495 P.2d 494, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1038(1972); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Brautigam, 127 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 821 (1962); Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 511 P.2d 375 (Ore. 1973).
14. Diplomat Elec., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 378 F.2d 377 (5th Cir.
1967); Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Ass'n, Inc., 417 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); Danias v. Fakis, 261 A.2d 529 (Del. 1969); Vojak v. Jensen,
161 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa 1968); Swagman v. Swift & Co., 7 Mich. App. 608, 152 N.W.2d
562 (1967); Demers v. Meuret, 512 P.2d 1348 (Ore. 1973).
15. Munafo v. Helfand, 140 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Tonsmeire v. Tons-
meire, 281 Ala. 102, 199 So. 2d 645 (1967); Vigil v. Rice, 74 N.M. 693, 397 P.2d 719
(1964).
16. McGuire v. Adkins, 284 Ala. 602, 226 So. 2d 659 (1969); Burney v. Southern
Ry., 276 Ala. 637, 165 So. 2d 726 (1964); Tyler v. Garris, 292 So. 2d 427 (Fla. App.
1974); Lewis v. Readers Digest Ass'n, Inc., 512 P.2d 702 (Mont. 1973).
17. Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269, (3d Cir. 1974); Blowers v. Lawyers
Co-op Pub. Co., 44 App. Div. 2d 760, 354 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1974); Beecher v. Montgom-
ery Ward & Co., 517 P.2d 667 (Ore. 1973).
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meaning attaches to the plaintiff."' Words are taken in the sense in which
they are reasonably understood under the circumstances and are to be
presumed to have the meaning ordinarily attached to them by those familiar
with the language used.19
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
At common law the courts generally recognized a conditional privilege of
fair comment regarding the affairs of public officials and employees, and any
topic within the scope of public concern. 20  The majority of states prior to
1964 held that this privilege was limited to opinions and could not shield a
publisher from liability for any misstatement of fact.21 However, a minority
of states held that the scope of the privilege was not limited, so long as the
publication was made in good faith.22
In 1964 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in New York
Times v. Sullivan,23 a libel action instituted in an Alabama state court by
a city commissioner against the publisher of an advertisement which de-
18. Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir. 1974); Paris v. Division of
State Compensation Ins. Fund, 517 P.2d 1353 (Colo. 1973); Alpar v. Weyerhauser Co.,
20 N.C. App. 340, 201 S.E.2d 503 (1974); MacFadden's Publications v. Turner, 95
S.W.2d 1027 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1936), error ref. n.r.e.
19. Scott v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 Cal. App. 3d 277, 112 Cal. Rptr. 609(1974); MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959).
20. Bishop v. Wometco Enterprises, Inc., 235 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1970); Hoeppner v.
Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N.Y. 95, 172 N.E. 139 (1930); Yancey v. Gillespie, 242 N.C.
227, 87 S.E.2d 210 (1955); Michlin v. Roberts, 318 A.2d 163 (Vt. 1974). Courts also
recognized several other privileges. See W. PRossmR, supra note 3, § 114.
21. Porcella v. Time, Inc., 300 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1962); Utah State Farm Bureau
Federation v. National Farmers Union Serv. Corp., 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1952);
Washington Times Co. v. Bonner, 86 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Post Publishing Co.
v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893); Starks v. Comer, 190 Ala. 245, 67 So. 440(1914); Star Publishing Co. v. Donahoe, 58 A. 513 (Del. 1904); Metropolis Co. v.
Croasdell, 145 Fla. 455, 199 So. 568 (1941); Kirkland v. Constitution Pub. Co., 38 Ga.
App. 632, 144 S.E. 821 (1928); Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123
N.E. 587 (1919); Smith v. Pure Oil Co., 278 Ky. 430, 128 S.W.2d 931 (1939); Miller
v. Capitol City Press, 142 So. 2d 462 (La, 1962); A.S. Abell Co. v. Kirby, 277 Md.
267, 176 A.2d 340 (1961); Hubbard v. Allyn, 200 Mass. 166, 86 N.E. 356 (1908);
Krebs v. McNeal, 222 Miss. 560, 76 So. 2d 693 (1955); Kleinschmidt v. Johnson, 183
S.W.2d 82 (Mo. 1944); Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947); Mur-
phy v. Farmers Educational & Co-op Union, 72 N.W.2d 636 (N.D. 1955); Westropp
v. E.W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E.2d 340 (1947); Holway v. World Pub.
Co., 171 Okla. 306, 44 P.2d 881 (1935); Marr v. Putnam, 196 Ore. 1, 246 P.2d 509(1952); Reed v. The Patriot Co., 45 Dauph. Co. Rep. 1 (Pa. 1937); Jackson v. Record
Pub. Co., 175 S.C. 211, 178 S.E. 833 (1935); Banner Pub. Co. v, State, 84 Tenn. 176(1885); Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Pub. Co., 149 Tex. 87, 228 S.W.2d 499 (1950); Car-
penter v. Meredith, 122 Va. 446, 96 S.E. 635 (1918); Cohen v. Cowles Pub. Co., 45
Wash. 2d 262, 273 P.2d 893 (1954). See also Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and
Candidates, 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 875 (1949); Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement
of Opinion-A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1962).
22. Connor v. Timothy, 43 Ariz. 517, 33 P.2d 293 (1934); Snively v. Record Pub.
Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921); Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142
Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955); Salinger v. Cowles, 195 Iowa 873, 191 N.W. 167(1922); Steenson v. Wallace, 144 Kan. 730, 62 P.2d 907 (1936); Robbins v. Evening
News Ass'n, 373 Mich. 589, 130 N.,W.2d 404 (1964); Clancy v. Dailey News Corp.,
202 Minn. 1, 277 N.W. 264 (1938); Blanchard v. Claremont Eagle, 95 N.H. 375, 63
A.2d 791 (1949); Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357, 149 A.2d 193(1959); Lewis v. Carr, 178 N.C. 578, 101 S.E. 97 (1919); McLean v. Merriman, 42
S.D. 394, 175 N.W. 878 (1920); Otten v. Schutt, 15 Wis. 2d 497, 113 N.W.2d 152
(1962)i
23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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scribed the mistreatment of black students protesting segregation. The Court
held that the guarantee of freedom of the press as prescribed by the first
amendment 24 conferred a qualified privilege for the publication of comment,
opinion, and false statements of fact regarding a public official and his official
conduct.2 5 This privilege existed unless it could be shown that the statements
were made with actual malice, 26 such statements being defined as those made
with knowledge that they were false, or with reckless disregard as to their
truth or falsity. 27 The Court justified its holding on the grounds that the deci-
sion would prevent self-censorship by the press.28
In Associated Press v. Walker29 and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts3" the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify issues concerning the applicabil-
ity of the New York Times rule to public figures as distinguished from public
officials. In Walker a retired general in the United States Army, who had
commanded federal troops during the school segregation confrontation in
Little Rock, Arkansas in 1952, alleged that the defendant published an
article claiming that he had taken charge of a mob and encouraged a riot
at the University of Mississippi.8 ' The plaintiff in Curtis was a well-known
college football coach and athletic director who charged that the defendant
published a false article which said that the plaintiff had fixed the University
of Georgia-Alabama football game.3 2  The Court held that both plaintiffs
were public figures, 33 and stated further that public figures, who by position
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I states that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press."
25. 376 U.S. at 281-82. Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg concurred in the re-
sult, but expressed the view that the United States Constitution confers an absolute, un-
conditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite any harm which may flow from
excesses and abuses. Id. at 293-305.
26. Id. at 279-80.
27. Id. The Court, therefore, adopted the minority rule. See note 22 supra. In
several cases subsequent to New York Times, the Supreme Court clarified the definition
of actual malice. Time Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971) (mere error in judgment does
not constitute actual malice); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (defend-
ant is protected from liability if he publishes in good faith, for a justified purpose, and
with a belief founded on reasonable grounds of the truth of the matter published);
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (rhetorical hyper-
bole does not constitute actual malice); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968)(plaintiff must show that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of his publications); Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967) (bad or
corrupt motive constitutes actual malice); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966)
(plaintiff can not recover for showing mere ill will, evil motive, or intent to injure);
Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (malice does not necessarily mean hatred or ill
will but may consist merely of culpable recklessness or a willful and wanton disregard
of the rights and interests of the defamed person); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964) (false statements made with a high degree of awareness of their possible falsity).
28. 376 U.S. at 279. See Levine, Times to Rosenbloom: A Press Free from Li-
bel-The Editors Speak, 27 MIAMI L. Rav. 109 (1972), for a discussion of New York
Times' impact on self-censorship by the press.
29. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 140.
32. id. at 135.
33. Id. at 155. The Supreme Court has applied the public official-figure test in a
variety of situations. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971) (city
mayor and candidate for tax assessor); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971) (police
official); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (candidate for U.S. Senate);
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (prominent
local real estate developer and builder, and a state legislator); St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727 (1968) (deputy sheriff); Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Banks, 389 U.S. 81
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or activities had thrust themselves into the vortex of an important public con-
troversy, would have to show actual malice in publications regarding such
controversies, in order to establish liability.3 4
The United States Supreme Court further expanded the scope of the New
York Times privilege in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc."5 In this case the
plaintiff was an obscure distributor of nudist magazines who sued a radio sta-
tion for referring to him as a smut merchant, and to his magazines as obscene,
in a broadcast regarding the city's enforcement of its obscenity statute.3 6 The
Court held that the New York Times standard should apply to all discussions
and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without
regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.37 If a
matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become
less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some
sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved.3 8 The
public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct
of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct,
not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.39 The Court reasoned that
this rule was necessary to insure the robust debate of public issues.40
III. GERTZ V. ROBERT WELCH, INC.
The principal issue presented to the Court in Gertz was whether a news-
paper or broadcaster who publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individ-
ual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a constitu-
tional privilege against liability for the injury inflicted by those statements. 41
In the majority opinion4 2 Justice Powell recognized that the United States
Supreme Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define the proper accom-
modations which must be made between the law of defamation and the first
amendment's freedoms of speech and press.43 The resolution of this issue,
according to the majority, involved the balancing of two legitimate interests-
avoiding self-censorship of the press and compensation of individuals for
(1967) (clerk of a state court); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (county recrea-
tion director); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (city police chief and county at-
torney); Garrison v. Louisiana, '379 U.S. 64 (1964) (state judges).
34. 388 U.S. at 155.
35. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
36. Id. at 33.
37. Id. at 44. The Court held that the report of matters of public or general in-
terest was common to all Supreme Court decisions since Walker. Id. at 30-32.
38. Id. at 43. The Court pointed out that certain areas of a person's life fall outside
the scope of public and general interest. Id. at 44.
39. Id. at 43. The Court stated that the public's primary interest in this case was
the proper enforcement of criminal laws, particularly obscenity statutes. Id.
40. Id.
41. 94 S. Ct. at 3003, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 801. The Court stated that it had previously
considered this issue on a rather different set of facts in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
403 U.S. 29 (1971). 94 S. Ct. at 3003, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 801.
42. Justice Powell was joined in his opinion by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and
Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun concurred on the grounds that his vote was necessary to
create a majority. If this had not been necessary, he stated that he would have adhered
to his view in Rosenbloom that the New York Times standard extended to defamatory
cases brought by private individuals. 94 S. Ct. at 3013, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 813.
43. Id. at 3000, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 797.
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harm inflicted upon them by defamatory falsehoods. 44 'In libel actions
instituted by public officials and public figures, New York Times reflects an
appropriate accommodation between these two interests in defining the actual
malice requirement. 45 However, the Court correctly concluded that the
states' interest in protecting a private individual was more important than
their interest in protecting public officials or public figures,46 and therefore,
the private individual's burden of establishing liability should be less stringent
than that of a public official or public figure. 47
In reaching this conclusion the majority reasoned that public officials and
public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to channels of effec-
tive communication, and hence, have a better opportunity to counteract false
statements than do private individuals. 48  Further, since a necessary conse-
quence of entering the arena of public affairs is closer public scrutiny and
increased public comment regarding their activities, public officials and
figures are considered to have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
risk of injury from defamatory falsehoods. 49 On the other hand, a private
individual has not waived his right to the state's protecton of his reputation. 50
Accordingly, the Court held that the states may develop appropriate stand-
ards of liability for publishing defamatory falsehoods regarding private
individuals, so long as the states do not impose liability without fault.51
With this decision, the Court has restricted the application of New York
Times to public officials and public figures.5 2 If there is clear and convincing
evidence of the plaintiff's general fame or notoriety in the community and
pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, then New York Times will
apply. 53 If not, the states may develop and apply new standards to establish
liability. 54 For example, the states might develop a two-tier system of liabil-
ity. If a private individual could establish ordinary negligence, he could
recover the compensatory damages which were proximately caused thereby.
Ordinary negligence would be an acceptable standard to the Supreme Court
because, on a continuum, it falls between strict liability and actual malice.
However, there are other possible standards such as slight negligence, reck-
lessness, and gross negligence. Second, states could permit a private individ-
44. Id. at 3008, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 806. In accommodating these values, the Court
asserted that a tension necessarily exists to preserve a vigorous press and redress wrong-
ful injury from defamation. Id.
45. Id. at 3008, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 807.
46. Id. at 3009, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 807.
47. Id. at 3010, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 808.
48. Id. at 3009, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 808. The Court pointed out that an opportunity
for rebuttal, standing alone, is insufficient to redress the harm of defamation. Id.
49. Id. The Court relied on Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), which held
that the public is justifiably interested in anything that touches upon an official's fitness
for office. Id. at 77.
50. 94 S. Ct. at 3010, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 808.
51. Id, at 3010, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 809. The Court noted that this standard provided
a more equitable accommodation between the competing concerns. Id. at 3011, 41 L.
Ed. 2d at 809.
52. Id. at 3008, 41 L. Ed. at 807.
53. Id. at 3013, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 812. The Court stated that the public figure





ual to recover punitive damages if he establishes actual malice. The Court
did not rule out this possibility in Gertz since it stated only that states may
not permit recovery of punitive damages when liability is not based on a
showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. 55
Justice Douglas criticized the majority opinion because of his belief that
there is an unconditional privilege for publication of public issues. There-
fore, according to Justice Douglas, the first amendment bars Congress or the
states from passing any libel law which inhibits the freedom of the press. 56
However, this view would result in the total sacrifice of an individual's right
to enjoy a good reputation. The dissent of Justice Brennan is grounded on
the contention that Rosenbloom, which he authored, should control.57 Since
the plaintiff failed to establish actual malice in the publication of an item
of public concern, he argued that the case should be affirmed.5 However,
Justice Brennan's position failed to protect the private individual who had
not voluntarily entered into the public arena. Chief Justice Burger dissented
on the grounds that he preferred to allow the law of defamation to evolve
along traditional lines, rather than fashion a new rule, which had no juris-
prudential ancestry;5 9 but, he failed to suggest whether the Rosenbloom or
the Gertz rule was a better accommodation between the law of defamation
and the first amendment. Finally, Justice White dissented, believing the
states should be free to impose a strict liability standard for the publication
of defamatory falsehoods.6 0 However, a strict liability standard would be an
undue burden on the media.
IV. CONCLUSION
With this decision the United States Supreme Court has restricted the ap-
plication of the New York Times doctrine to public officials and public
figures. The states are free to adopt appropriate standards for private indi-
viduals, as long as those standards do not include liability without fault. It
is doubtful that the decision will produce a dramatic increase in the number
of defamation suits instituted by private citizens, for litigation is expensive
and time consuming. However, there should be an increase in the percent-
age of successful private citizen litigants in this area, if the states promulgate
less stringent standards for establishing liability.
J. Graham Hill
55. Id. at 3011, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 810.
56. Id. at 3015, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 815. Justice Douglas feared that by allowing the
states to adopt a negligence standard, even reasonable men would refrain from speaking.
Id. at 3017, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 817.
57. Id. at 3018, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 818. Justice Brennan stated that the rule an-
nounced in Gertz did not allow the press adequate breathing space. Id. at 3017, 41 L.
Ed. 2d at 817.
58. Id. at 3021, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 822.
59. Id. at 3014, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 814. Additionally, Chief Justice Burger as-
serted that by including attorneys within the public figure definition, the constitutional
right to counsel would be undermined. Id.
60. Id. at 3031-33, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 833-35. Justice White stated that in Gertz the
Court is discarding the judgment of the fifty states. Id. at 3031, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 833.
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NOTES
The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Discretionary Appeals
The respondent, an indigen.t, was convicted of forgery in two counties of
North Carolina and was represented by court-appointed counsel at both
trials. His convictions were both -affirmed on appeal of right by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals.' In one case the respondent's application for
certiorari to the North Carolina Supreme Court, filed with the assistance of
counsel, was denied, 2 and in the other case, in which the respondent was
denied the appointment of counsel to assist in his appeal, the state supreme
court dismissed the appeal on the grounds of tardiness.
Following the denial of certiorari in the first case, the respondent unsuc-
cessfully sought the appointment of counsel to assist him in preparing a writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. He then filed a writ of
habeas corpus in the middle and western federal district courts of North
Carolina alleging that the denial of assistance of counsel on a discretionary
appeal to the state supreme court and on application for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court was in each instance a denial of respondent's
federal rights under the sixth amendment. The district courts denied relief,
but these holdings were reversed on appeal by the Fourth Circuit, which held
that the states have a constitutional obligation to provide counsel to an indi-
gent on a discretionary appeal to a state supreme court or the United States
Supreme Court. s  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 4
Held, reversed: Neither the due process clause nor the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment require a state to appoint counsel for
an indigent on a discretionary 'appeal either to the state supreme court or
for the preparation of a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL: ITS DEVELOPMENT
The sixth amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 5
This constitutional mandate was first applied narrowly by the United States
Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama.6 In Powell the Court held that in
capital cases the defendant has a right to representation of counsel, despite
1. State v. Moffitt, 181 S.E.2d 184 (N.C. App. 1971); State v. Moffitt, 177 S.E.2d
324 (N.C. App. 1970).
2. State v. Moffitt, 279 N.C. 396, 183 S.E.2d 247 (1971).
3. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973); Note, Right to Counsel on All
Appeals, 11 Hous. L. REv. 725 (1974).
4. 414 U.S. 1128 (1974).
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
6. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court in Powell,
provided a policy argument for the sixth amendment right to counsel: "The right to
be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to
be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and some-
times no skill in the science of law. . . . He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces




his impoverishment. Since Powell, the questions which the Court has been
faced with can be divided into three categories: the standard which should
be applied by the Court in determining an alleged denial of constitutional
right to counsel;7 -the constitutional basis which should be used in deciding
a right to counsel question;s and the most encompassing of all, the extent
to which the right to counsel is constitutionally guaranteed in our criminal
process. 9
A Standard for Right to Counsel. Although the Court in Powell was careful
to emphasize the importance of guaranteeing the right to counsel, it did not
imply that this right was a blanket guarantee which must be provided in all
types of cases. Ten years later this limitation of Powell was explained by
the Court in Betts v. Brady10 where the petitioner, an indigent indicted of
robbery, went to trial without the aid of counsel. The Court rejected the
incorporation theory, which would have made the sixth amendment mandate
of right to counsel applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, and held that the states were not constitutionally
obligated to provide counsel in all types of cases. The Court pointed to the
fact that the defendant in this case "was a man forty-three years old, of
ordinary intelligence, and ability to take care of his own interests on the trial
of that narrow issue,"" thus implying that there were no special circum-
stances in this case which made counsel an absolute prerequisite to a fair
trial. The Court in Betts articulated the "special circumstances and funda-
mental fairness" test,' 2 which, for a time was employed in right to counsel
cases. In essence, this test stated that a court should look closely at the facts
of each right to counsel case and determine whether special circumstances
existed such that assistance of counsel was an absolute necessity in assuring
fundamental fairness at trial. Requiring a case-by-case analysis, the test thus
left the states free to advance and develop their own standards and legislative
policies on the right to counsel issue.' 3
,In 1963 the United States Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wain-
wright,14 wherein it formulated the "critical stage in the prosecution" test,15
7. See notes 11-18 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 19-21 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 23-57 infra. See generally Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel
in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1(1964); Steele, The Doctrine of Right to Counsel: Its Impact on the Administration of
Criminal Justice and the Legal Profession, 23 Sw. L.J. 488 (1969).
10. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
11. Id. at 472.
12. The special circumstances and fundamental fairness test promulgated in Betts
was further defined in Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948): "Where the
gravity of the crime and other factors-such as the age and education of the defendant,
the conduct of the court or prosecuting officials, and the complicated nature of the of-
fense charged and the possible defenses thereto--render criminal proceedings without
counsel so apt to result in injustice as to be fundamentally unfair,. . . the accused must
have legal assistance . . . ." See also Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962);
Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
13. In reaching his conclusion that the right to counsel ought to be a matter of state
choice and legislative policy, Mr. Justice Roberts emphasized that over half of the states
did not consider providing counsel an essential element of a fair trial. 316 U.S. at 471.
14. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15. See notes 23-30 infra and accompanying text.
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which incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel into the fourteenth
amendment and made it obligatory on the states. Relying on numerous de-
cisions in the area of right -to counsel, 16 the Court concluded that the Betts
decision was "an abrupt break with . . . well-considered precedents.117  By
reestablishing the constitutional principles which had been followed prior to
the Betts decision, the Court concluded that since Gideon had been denied
the right to counsel at his trial, such a deprivation was in fact a denial of
a fundamental -right at a critical stage in his prosecution.
The Constitutional Basis for Right to Counsel. Once the constitutional guar-
antee had been made applicable to the states by incorporation into the four-
teenth amendment, the Court was free to turn to the provisions of the four-
teenth amendment for a standard, as well as a means of expanding and de-
veloping this constitutional guarantee. 18 Using the standards' 9 and meaning
set forth in the due process and equal protection clauses, the Court has nar-
rowed its consideration to two factors. The first is whether a critical stage
in the prosecution is involved, such that failing to provide counsel would in
effect deny the defendant his fundamental rights to a fair trial and due
process of law. Secondly, the Court has considered whether the inability of
the indigent to employ counsel at -this stage in the proceedings effectively
denies him equal protection under the law.
II. EXPANSION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL DOCTRINE:
FROM ARREST TO APPEAL
Since the establishment of standards for the right to counsel doctrine, the
Court has been faced with the problem of defining the actual and practical
meaning of "critical stage in the prosecution." Through this interpretation,
the doctrine of right to counsel has experienced tremendous expansion and
growth. This development has been based on the prevailing theory and
philosophy that there is no rational relation between a party's ability to pay
and his guilt or innocence, and "a State can no more discriminate on account
of poverty than on account of religion, race or color."'20  The expansion of
the meaning and scope of "critical stage" and, thus, the constitutional guaran-
tee of right to counsel, has been witnessed in three basic areas, the pretrial
stage, the trial stage, and the post-conviction and appellate stage.
16. The Court particularly relied on its decisions in Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936), where it had said: "We concluded that certain funda-
mental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal action, were
also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of coun-
sel in a criminal prosecution." See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17. 372 U.S. at 344.
18. As recognized by Professor Steele, the language of the sixth amendment is not
sufficient in and of itself to supply a standard to be used in judging right to counsel
issues. He explains that at the time the sixth amendment was written the duties and
role of an attorney were in a rather primitive, undeveloped stage. For this reason, he
concludes that the words in the sixth amendment, including "criminal prosecution," "ac-
cused," and "defense," are too narrow to provide a meaningful standard or a "vehicle"
for developing the right to counsel doctrine, and thus the courts had to turn to the four-
teenth amendment. Steele, supra note 9.
19. See notes 11-18 supra and accompanying text.
20. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-18 (1956).
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The Pretrial Stage. In numerous landmark cases, including Escobedo
v. United States,21 Miranda v. Arizona,22 and Massiah v. United States,
23
the court stated that both pre-indictment and post-indictment interrogation
represented critical stages in the criminal prosecution such that there was a
constitutional right ito have counsel present. In the pretrial area of arraign-
ments the Court decided in Hamilton v. Alabama that an arraignment was a
critical stage in the criminal process and stated, "When one pleads to a capital
charge without benefit of counsel, we do not stop to dotermine whether prej-
udice resulted. '24  On the question of preliminary hearings 'the Court con-
cluded in Coleman v. Alabama25 that the denial of counsel at a preliminary
hearing was a constitutional deprivation at a critical stage in the prosecution.
Relying on these earlier cases, the Court, four years after Gideon, turned
its full focus and attention to the question of pretrial critical stages in the
case of United States v. Wade.26 In that case the Court was faced with the
issue of whether the right to counsel was constitutionally guaranteed at a
post-indictment lineup. Reasoning that this lineup was a critical stage in the
prosecution, the Court concluded that there was a, substantial potential for
prejudice and ithat the "presence of counsel . .. [could] often avert preju-
dice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial."'27  In Wade the Court
articulated an important, precedential standard for pretrial confrontation
issues: "It is central to that [Powell v. Alabama] principle, that in addition
to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not
stand alone against the state at any stage -of the prosecution, formal or in-
formal, in Court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the ac-
cused's right to a fair trial."'28  Thus, it is clear from the numerous pretrial
cases, that the Court has a duty in every pretrial situation to scrutinize and
evaluate the confrontation and determine whether the absence of counsel will
in fact prejudice the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.
The cases of Powell v. Alabama29 and Gideon v. Wainwright30 stand as
the landmarks which established the basic standards of right 'to counsel at
the trial stage. However, the potential breadth and scope of the right to
21. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In this case the Court stated that once the focus of the
interrogation turns to the defendant, the sixth and fourteenth amendments require that
counsel be provided if the defendant requests it and the defendant must be informed of
his right to have an attorney present.
22. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda the Court slightly modified its holding in
Escobedo but brought about the same ultimate result. The Court stated that once the
questioning takes on the aspects of a custodial interrogation, the defendant's right to
counsel arises.
23. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Mr. Justice Stewart writing for the majority held that
the petitioner's sixth amendment right to counsel was violated when incriminating state-
ments, made by petitioner after indictment, without the aid of counsel, were introduced
as evidence against him at trial. See also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
24. 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961). This decision was reaffirmed two years later in a per
curiam decision where a defendant pleaded guilty to a charge during a preliminary hear-
ing without the aid of counsel, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
25. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
26. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
27. Id. at 236.
28. Id. at 226.
29. 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
30. 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
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counsel at trial was left limitless by the Court in Powell, which concluded a de-
fendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him."''3 Thus, numerous questions were left unanswered; for while
it was clear from Gideon that in all felony trials the defendant had a right
to counsel, the question of right to counsel for misdemeanor offenses re-
mained a hazy and poorly defined area. An answer to this question was
finally provided in Duncan v. Louisiana, which held that the right to court-
appointed counsel extended only to trial for non-petty offenses punishable
by more than six months imprisonment. 32 The six-month imprisonment rule
of Duncan was, however, specifically overruled by the Supreme Court in
Argersinger v. Hamlin33 when the Court held that absent a knowing and
intelligent waiver no one could be imprisoned for an offense without repre-
sentation by counsel.34  The Court concluded that there is nothing inherent
either in the nature or complexity of a misdemeanor trial which makes the
need of counsel any less of a prerequisite to the guarantee of a fair trial.3 5
In addition to misdemeanor trials, another important expansion of the right
to counsel doctrine at the trial stage occurred in 1967 when the Court held
that there was a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel at the trial of
juveniles .36  Discarding the distinction between an adult felony trial and a
juvenile trial, the Court reasoned that in any case where the juvenile might
be deprived of his liberty, the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment mandated that he be provided with counsel.37  Thus the Court, relying
specifically on Powell and Gideon, stressed both the constitutional and prac-
tical need for counsel in misdemeanor and juvenile trials.
The Post-Conviction and Appellate Stages. On numerous occasions the
Court has evaluated and relied on the principles articulated in cases con-
cerning earlier stages in the prosecution, and concluded that many of these
standards are equally applicable to post-conviction and appellate stages. In
Mempa v. Rhay38 the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that whether
31. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). See also Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972); in re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963).
32. 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968).
33. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
34. Id. at 37. In reaching its decision in Argersinger, the Court first took note of
two cases, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right of confrontation), and Wash-
ington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
one's favor), and concluded that in neither of these cases were the rights discussed lim-
ited to felonies, but were held to apply generally to all criminal trials.
35. See generally Allison & Phelps, Can We Afford To Provide Trial Counsel for
the Indigent in Misdemeanor Cases?, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 76 (1971); Junker,
The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685, 705 (1968); Note,
Right to Counsel: A New Standard, 27 Sw. L.J. 406 (1973).
36. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
37. The Court rejected the claim that the probation officer or the parents or even
the judge could fairly represent a child's interest at a hearing. Id. at 36. In discussing
the practical need of counsel, the Court noted that attendant with the natural problems
of the legal process, a juvenile particularly needs a counsel's assistance, "to make skilled
inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain
whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it." Id.
38. 389 U.S. 128 (1967). For a detailed analysis of the Mempa decision see Co-
hen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa v.
Rhay, 47 TExAs L. REv. 1 (1968).
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a post-conviction hearing is labeled a deferred sentencing or probation revo-
cation hearing, the right to have counsel present is constitutionally guaran-
teed.3 9 However, six years later the Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli40 distin-
guished the Mempa case on a procedural point and concluded :that there
was no constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel at probation revocation
hearings. 41 By its decision in that case, the Court greatly limited the Mempa
rule and dealt its first substantial blow to the development of the right to
counsel doctrine.
Another post-conviction stage which has experienced considerable growth
and development is the dual area of right -to a free transcript and right to
counsel on appeal. 42 In Griffin v. lllinois43 the Court concluded that the due
process and equal protection clauses dictate that an indigent must be pro-
vided with a free copy of his trial transcript in preparing his appeal. -In di-
recting a considerable amount of attention to the problem of indigency and
the law, Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, emphasized that
"[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an
age-old problem."' 44 He concluded that to deny an indigent the right -to have
a transcript of his trial would be an "invidious discrimination" and asserted
that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on -the amount of money he has."'45
Relying on the Griffin principle, the Court, in reviewing various state pro-
cedures, developed a line of "transcript and filing fee cases" in which it
further expanded the rights of the indigent in the appellate process. In
Burns v. Ohio46 an indigent was deprived of the right ;to apply for a discre-
tionary review by 'the Ohio Supreme Court because of his inability to pay
the filing fees. The Court concluded that this state action was a deprivation
of the defendant's constitutional rights and promulgated the rule that once
a state has established an appellate review system for its criminal cases, an
indigent may not be deprived of access to any part of that process by reason
of his poverty. 47 'Expanding the right to a free transcript to its logical con-
39. Mr. Justice Marshall particularly emphasized that such a hearing was unques-
tionably a critical stage in the criminal process in that "the [parole] [b]oard places con-
siderable weight on these recommendations [for the defendant]." 389 U.S. at 135.
40. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
41. Concluding that a probation revocation hearing is not a critical stage in the
criminal process, the Court distinguished Mempa on the grounds that sentencing also
occurred at the hearing in that case. Id. at 781. The Court reasoned that the states
are not under a constitutional duty to provide counsel at all probation revocation hear-
ings, but rather the need for such counsel ought to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 788. The need for informality, flexibility, and economy, the Court determined,
overrides the potential prejudice to the defendant by not having counsel present. Id.
at 790.
42. See, Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv.
783 (1961); Day, Coming: The Right To Have Counsel at All Appellate Stages, 52
A.B.A.J. 135 (1966).
43. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
44. Id. at 16.
45. Id. at 19. This standard of "invidious discrimination" and its rule concerning
the right of free transcripts for indigents was reaffirmed two years later in a per curiam
decision in which the Court held that by failing to provide a trial record to an indigent,
the State of Washington had deprived the defendant of his fourteenth amendment rights.
Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
46. 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
47. id. at 257. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, emphasized that the
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clusion, the Court in Mayer v. City of Chicago4s relied on the principles of
Griffin and Burns in concluding that even on a discretionary appeal, the indi-
gent must be provided with a free transcript.
Tied closely -to the "transcript" cases is a second aspect of appellate de-
velopment, namely, the right to counsel on indigent appeal. This constitu-
tional guarantee was extensively developed in the area of federal courts by
the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v. United States49 that an indigent's
appeal may not be dismissed until he has been provided with counsel to assist
him in preparing it.
Turning its attention for the first time to state appellate procedures, the
Court considered the standards which had been promulgated by numerous
federal procedure cases and held in its landmark decision of Douglas v.
California5" that denial of counsel on appeal in a state proceeding was a di-
rect violation of an indigent's due process and equal protection rights. Ap-
plying the "invidious discrimination" standard of Griffin, the Court over-
turned a California rule of criminal procedure, by which an indigent was af-
forded counsel on appeal only after a determination that counsel would be
helpful to either the defendant or the court, and reasserted its standard that
"there can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys
'depends on the amount of money he has.' "51
The Douglas principle of right to counsel on first appeal was further de-
fined and interpreted in several subsequent cases. In Swenson v. Bosler5"
the Court overturned a Missouri rule of criminal procedure and held that
despite a defendant's failure to request counsel on appeal, his right to an at-
torney was constitutionally guaranteed and, -therefore, must be provided.
Expounding on the role of an attorney on appeal, the Court in A nders v.
California53 emphasized that an attorney representing an indigent on appeal
must perform his duty and responsibility to the best of his capability and
could withdraw from the case only upon a documented finding that the
appeal was wholly frivolous. 'It is important to emphasize, however, that the
Douglas line of cases and the principles promulgated therein did not apply
beyond the first appeal as of right, for the Court in Douglas specifically re-
served the question of whether this constitutional guarantee should be ex-
panded to discretionary appellate review.54
III. Ross v. MOFFITT
Relying primarily on an analysis of due process and equal protection rights,
the Court in Ross v. Moffitt held that the constitutionally protected right of
principle of equal appellate review is no less applicable where a state has provided equal
appellate review for the first stage but has foreclosed the indigent from the second stage
(the discretionary stage) simply because of his poverty. See Entsminger v. Iowa, 386
U.S. 748 (1967); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438 (1962); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
48. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
49. 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
50. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
51. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
52. 386 U.S. 258 (1967).
53. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
54. 372 U.S. at 356.
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counsel does not extend to discretionary appeals but instead is limited to the
first appeal as of right. The Court rejected the rationale of Chief Judge
Haynsworth of the Fourth Circuit that "[a]s long as the state provides such
procedures -and allows other convicted felons to seek access -to the higher
court with the help of retained counsel, there is a marked absence of fairness
in denying an indigent the assistance of counsel as he seeks access to the same
court." 55  Mr. Justice Rehnquist writing for a six-man majority concluded
that the denial of counsel in a discretionary appeal, which is not a critical
stage in the prosecution, does not amount to an "invidious discrimination."
However, the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas relied on the reasoning of Chief
Judge Haynsworth and came to the opposite conclusion, that "[t]he state's
highest court remains the ultimate arbiter of the rights of its citizens," 6 and
thus -there was a constitutional need for counsel at a discretionary appeal.
The majority, in reversing the Fourth Circuit, reanalyzed the meaning and
scope of the fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection clauses.
It emphasized the 'basic principle of McKane v. Durston5 7 that a state is un-
der no constitutional obligation to provide any appellate review procedure.
However, the majority cited several earlier Supreme Court decisions which
demonstrate the Court's perpetual concern with financial barriers and appel-
late state procedures which in fact violate an indigent's fourteenth amend-
ment rights.58  The Court concluded that "a state cannot arbitrarily cut off
appeal rights for indigents while leaving -open -avenues of appeal for more
affluent persons."59 Characterizing the Court's decision in Douglas as a
departure from the "limited doctrine of the transcript and fee cases," the
Court emphasized that Douglas was specifically limited to right to counsel
on first appeal."0 However, the dissent read Douglas as standing for the
55. 483 F.2d at 654.
56. 417 U.S. at 620, quoting 483 F.2d at 653. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing the dis-
senting opinion, emphasizes the procedural differences between filing a brief on appeal
and applying for a writ of certiorari, which was a major rationale of the court of ap-
peals' decision. Chief Judge Haynsworth of the Fourth Circuit stressed the fact that
an indigent could file a brief on appeal containing the simple elements of his case with-
out a need of going into all the legal aspects. An application for writ of certiorari, on
the other hand, by the very nature of the proceeding requires the skill and guidance of
counsel to present the claims properly.
57. 153 U.S. 684 (1894). The majority stated: "An appeal from a judgment of
conviction is not a matter of absolute right, independently of constitutional or statutory
provisions allowing such appeals. A review by an appellate court of the final judgment
in a criminal case, however grave the offense of which the accused is convicted was not
at common law and is not now a necessary element of due process of law." Id. at 687.
58. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (a procedure by which an indigent
was entitled to a free transcript only after a judge determined that his appeal was not
frivolous was held invalid); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (an Indiana statute
providing that only a public defender could obtain a free transcript was held invalid):
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (in a collateral proceeding the refusal of the
state to docket an indigent's case because of his inability to pay the filing fees was held
to be a fourteenth amendment violation); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (a de-
fendant, having already been afforded one appellate review of his case, should not be
denied the opportunity to invoke the discretionary appellate review). Note, however,
that the Court in Ross neglected to mention the most recent development in the Griffin
line of cases, namely, Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), in which the
Court extended the right to a trial transcript to all appeals.
59. 417 U.S. at 607.
60. Note however that the majority in Ross failed to mention the pre-Douglas deci-
sions of Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957), and Ellis v. United States, 356
U.S. 674 (1958), both dealing with the rights of counsel on appeal. Also omitted in
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somewhat different principle of "fairness and equality" and thus concluded
that the right to counsel which was guaranteed in Douglas ought also to be
extended to a discretionary appeal.61
Mr. Justice Rehnquist emphasized for the majority that neither due process
nor equal protecton was sufficient in and of itself to provide a true standard
for the right to counsel doctrine. Each focuses on different aspects and fac-
tors and for -that reason each clause ought -to be analyzed separately and then
used together in reaching a decision.6 2 In considering the due process guar-
antee, the Court cited Gideon v. Wainwright in emphasizing that the right
to counsel at trial is a fundamental aspect of due process, but concluded that
there Were important distinctions between the trial and appellate stages, thus
warranting different constitutional treatment. 3 Reemphasizing the McKane
v. Durston principle, the majority concluded that simply because a state has
chosen to establish an appellate review structure it "does not automatically
mean that a State then acts unfairly by refusing to provide counsel to indigent
defendants at every stage of -the way."6' 4
The Court then turned its attention to a consideration of the equal protec-
tion clause. In citing San Antonio -Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez65 the majority emphasized that a state is not required under the four-
teenth amendment to provide complete equality or precisely equal economic
conditions to its citizens. States may develop various civil and criminal pro-
cedures which do not amount to a violation of the parties' equal protection
rights even though different results may occur under the provisions. How-
ever, the Court concluded that in the area of criminal appellate procedure
the equal protection clause mandates that once a state has established an ap-
pellate system it must be maintained in such a manner that it is free of un-
reasoned distinctions and provide an indigent with a fair opportunity to
present his case before it.66
Reviewing the North Carolina appellate procedure pertinent to this case, 67
the Court noted that unlike the first appeal as a matter of right, where the
major question is whether the defendant's conviction was proper, in a discre-
tionary appeal the Court is primarily concerned with such issues as whether
the appeal has particular public interest, whether the issues on appeal raise
important legal questions of significance to the legal community, or whether
the discussion in Ross were the cases of Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967), and
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), which further advanced and interpreted the
Douglas rule.
61. 417 U.S. at 621.
62. Mr. Justice Rehnquist noted fundamental differences between the due process
and equal protection guarantees: "'Due Process' emphasizes fairness between the State
and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same
situation may be treated. 'Equal protection,' on the other hand, emphasizes disparity
in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably in-
distinguishable." Id. at 609.
63. In emphasizing the differences between the trial and appellate stages, the Court
stated: "The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him
against being 'haled into court' by the State and stripped of his presumption of inno-
cence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt." Id. at 610-11.
64. Id.
65. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
66. 417 U.S. at 611-12.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-27 (Supp. 1974), 7A-30, -31 (1969).
19741 NOTES 1059
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the conviction in the lower court is at odds with the trend of the law or pre-
vious Supreme Court rulings.68 The Court emphasized that following an af-
firmance of a defendant's conviction on first appeal, the indigent defendant
will have a transcript of his trial, the brief that was filed in his case on the
first appeal, and, in some instances, an opinion by the lower court affirming
his conviction. With all of these to aid the indigent in preparing to file for
a discretionary appeal, an attorney, though he might be quite useful and
beneficial, is not constitutionally required. 69 Thus, the Court reasoned, it is
not necessary under the Constitution for the State to provide counsel either
on discretionary appeals to the state supreme court or to aid the indigent in
preparing a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. It is, the
Court concluded, and should remain, a matter of legislative policy and
choice.70
Ross v. Moffitt has three definite and immediate effects on the constitu-
tional issue of right to counsel. First, it has brought the growth and develop-
ment of the right to counsel doctrine in appellate review to an abrupt halt.
The Ross decision has definitely established the parameters and limits of the
Douglas principle; the indigent has a right to counsel in one appeal and one
appeal only.
Secondly, Ross will ultimately have an enormously limiting effect on
earlier decisions in, both -the Douglas and Griffin line of cases. The Burns
principle that a defendant should not be foreclosed from any phase of a
state's appellate procedures merely because he is an indigent, will be severely
restricted by the Ross abolishment of right to counsel beyond the first appeal.
In a similar manner, -the holding in Mayer v. 'City of Chicago that an indigent
is entitled to a free transcript at all levels of appeal, has, by the Ross decision,
left the indigent in a precarious position in a discretionary appeal. While
he is constitutionally entitled to have a trial transcript -under his arm when
he walks into a state supreme court, he has been deprived the right of having
a lawyer at his side. The Mayer decision, which a few years ago appeared
to be a logical extension of the right to counsel doctrine, now stands as the
most liberal outgrowth of the Griffin-Douglas development. In short, the
Griffin line of transcript and filing fee cases has been permitted to expand
to its logical conclusion, while the Douglas development has been abruptly
curtailed.
The third and undoubtedly most significant change brought on by the Ross
decision is the emergence of new standards in the area of due process and
equal protection rights. Gone is the era when the Court's concern and s'ensi-
tivity for the defendant's needs led them to the conclusion that the type of
justice and trial a person gets should not depend on the size of his pocket-
book. A new era in the right to counsel doctrine has begun, with the Court
viewing an attorney on appeal as a "sword" to be used in trying to reverse
68. 417 U.S. at 613-14. It is open to question whether an indigent unaided by coun-
sel can properly evaluate his case and be able to conclude whether his case is of public
interest, of important legal significance, or in conflict with other Supreme Court deci-
sions.
69. Id. at 616-18.
70. Id. at 618-19.
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a conviction, and holding a philosophy concerning the needs of indigents that
"the fact that a particular service might be of benefit to an indigent defendant
does not mean that the service is constitutionally required."'' l Indeed, by
Ross v. Moffitt the Court has altered and redirected a long line of well-
considered precedent in the area of right to counsel and through that altera-
tion has dealt a substantial blow to the expansion of -the right to counsel
doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
At this point most of the implications and potential changes brought on
by the Ross decision are quite speculative. The true force and underlying
meaning of Ross v. Moffitt will be neither clearly seen nor totally -appreciated
until the Court is again faced with an indigent right to counsel case. For
the present time, we only know that -the progressive expansion of -the right
to counsel in indigent appeals has been retarded. With that constriction, the
development and growth of the right -to counsel on -appeal and the concern
of the Court in protecting the indigent's equality in the appellate process has
also been greatly restricted. By means of the Ross decision, -the Supreme
Court has told the indigent that once the benefit of counsel has been granted
on the first appeal, he must then rely on his own resources and talents in
all subsequent hearings on his case.
Patricia A. Stevenson
Internal Revenue Code Section 6851, Deficiency Notice
Required: Clark v. Campbell
On June 11, 1969, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs and local officials conducted a search of two buildings, be-
lieving that narcotics belonging to plaintiff were concealed therein. Plaintiff
was arrested and a substantial amount of his personal property was seized.
About one month after the search the Internal Revenue Service notified
plaintiff that his taxable period had been terminated pursuant to section
6851 of the Internal Revenue Code' and that 'a tax of $104,697.20 had
been assessed which was immediately due and payable. The Service served
notices of levy on several institutions which were believed to possess money
or property of plaintiff and also posted notices of levy on real estate owned
by plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court, seeking to re-
move clouds on the title to the real property and to enjoin collection of the
taxes, insisting that the Service had erroneously failed to issue him a for-
mal notice of deficiency. 2 The district court agreed that the deficiency no-
71. Id. at 616.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6851.
2. The deficiency notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite of the Tax Court. Id. §§
19741 NOTES 1061
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tice was required and, because it had not been timely issued, granted the re-
quested relief.3 On appeal held, affirmed: The liability created pursuant to
a section 6851 termination is a statutory deficiency, assessable under sec-
tion 6861,4 entitling plaintiff to a notice of deficiency, and upon the Service's
failure to issue the notice timely, plaintiff may seek injunctive relief. Clark
v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974).
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The Internal Revenue Code provides the "ordinary taxpayer" 5 with a
choice of forums in which to contest an alleged tax deficiency6 which has
been determined and assessed by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to
section 6201, 7 -the general assessment section. He may pay the full amount
of the tax8 as determined by the Service, file a mandatory claim for refund
or credit,9 and bring a suit for refund in district court. 10 Alternatively, he
may elect under section 621311 to withhold payment of the deficiency and
file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the amount of the
deficiency. The Code expressly conditions the jurisdiction of the Tax Court
upon the mailing of a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer, 1 2 making the
notice of paramount importance.13
While this procedure is sufficient to handle the great majority of cases,
it was recognized that the collection of taxes might be jeopardized in some
6213(a), 6214(a). See also Mason v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1954).
The Tax Court provides the taxpayer with a forum to review the Service's determination
of his tax liability before payment of the tax.
3. Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6861.
5. The term "ordinary taxpayer" is used herein to mean the taxpayer who files his
return with the Internal Revenue Service, but does not include the taxpayer who has had
his taxable period terminated pursuant to § 6851, or the taxpayer whose payment of the
tax has been accelerated under § 6861.
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6211 provides in part:
[Tjhe term 'deficiency' means the amount by which the tax imposed ...
exceeds the excess of-(1) the sum of(A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return,
if a return was made by the taxpayer and an amount was shown as
the tax by the taxpayer thereon, plus(B) the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assess-
ment) as a deficiency, over-
(2) the amount of rebates . . . made.
The existence of the deficiency triggers § 6212(a), authorizing the Service to send
the taxpayer a formal notice of the deficiency by registered or certified mail. Section
6213(a) prohibits the assessment of the deficiency, levy, or proceeding to collect the de-
ficiency until the deficiency notice has been mailed to the taxpayer. The failure of the
Service to issue the deficiency notice permits the taxpayer to institute suit to enjoin the
assessment, levy, or any judicial proceeding to collect the tax, notwithstanding the anti-
injuntion statute, § 7421. Id. § 6213(a).
7. Id. § 6201.
8. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960), wherein the Court held that
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1970), the jurisdictional statute for suits for a refund in the
district court, required full payment of the assessment as a prerequisite to suit.
9. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7422.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (Supp. 1971). The district court's original jurisdiction is con-
current with the Court of Claims.
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6213.
12. See note 2 supra.
13. The failure of the Service to issue a deficiency notice enables the taxpayer to
take affirmative judicial action. See note 6 supra.
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unusual circumstances. 14 Consequently, Congress enacted two code sec-
tions, now sections 6861 and 6851, which provided procedures to help as-
sure the collection of taxes under such circumstances. Section 6861 en-
ables the district director to accelerate payment of the tax after the taxpayer's
tax year has run but before it would otherwise be due,' 5 and section 6851
permits the district director to terminate the taxpayer's taxable period.
Section 6861-Jeopardy Assessments. Section 6861 had its origin in section
274(d) of the Revenue Act of 1924.16 Section 6861 permits the district di-
rector to assess a deficiency immediately, give notice, and make demand for
its payment if he believes that the assessment or collection of the deficiency
will be jeopardized by delay. 17 This power is tempered by several valu-
able procedural safeguards. Under section 6861(b) the Service is required
to mail a formal deficiency notice to the taxpayer within sixty days after
the making of the jeopardy assessment. The notice provides the jeopardy
taxpayer' 8 with the same choice of forums as is ,available to the ordinary
taxpayer. Thus, as an alternative to his action for refund in the district
court, the -taxpayer may petition .the Tax Court for a prepayment redetermi-
nation of his tax liability. Section 6213(a) permits the jeopardy taxpayer,
like the ordinary taxpayer, upon the failure of the Service timely to comply
with the deficiency notice requirement, to bring suit in the district court to
enjoin assessment and levy or seizure of taxpayer's property by the Service.
If the notice requirement is satisfied, the taxpayer is permitted to stay the
collection of the jeopardy assessment by filing an adequate bond with the
Service. 19 If he is unable to file the bond, the Service still cannot sell the
taxpayer's property to satisfy the alleged deficiency, absent specified condi-
tions.2 0  In addition, the Service may abate the jeopardy assessment upon a
finding that jeopardy does not exist.2'
14. See, e.g., Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1974) (taxpayer at-
tempting to take $300,000 in cash out of the United States in a suitcase hidden in his
car); Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973), discussed in text accompanying notes
49-53 infra; Yannicelli v. Nash, 354 F. Supp. 143 (D.N.J. 1973) (taxpayer failed to re-
port income realized from "gambling operations").
15. An individual's return must be filed and the tax paid, absent an extension, on
or before the fifteenth day of the fourth month following the close of taxpayer's calendar
or fiscal year. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6072.
16. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(d), 43 Stat. 297. See also notes 28-32
infra and accompanying text.
17. This delay would result from the lapse of time between the date of assessment
and the date when the taxpayer would ordinarily pay his tax. See also note 15 supra
and accompanying text.
18. Although both § 6851 and § 6861 involve situations where the collection of the
tax is in jeopardy, the term "jeopardy taxpayer" is used herein to mean only those tax-
payers who come within the ambit of § 6861.
19. The bond should generally be in an amount equal to the amount of the jeopardy
assessment. The amount may be less than the amount assessed but in such event the
bond operates only to stay the collection of the bond's principal amount. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 6863.
20. The seized property may not be sold during the period in which the taxpayer
may petition the Tax Court. Id. § 6863(b) (3)(A) (i). If the taxpayer files a petition
with the Tax Court, sale is further stayed during the pendency of that proceeding. Id.
§ 6863 (b) (3) (A) (ii). The property may be sold, however, if the taxpayer consents to
the sale or the Service determines that the expenses of conservation and maintenance
will greatly reduce the net proceeds or the property is liable to perish. Id. § 6863(b)
(3)(B).
21. Id. § 6861(g).
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Section 6851-Termination of Taxable Year. The second mechanism avail-
able to the Service in circumstances where the collection of tax revenue is in
jeopardy exists in section 6851. This section permits a district director to
terminate the taxable period of a taxpayer immediately and demand pay-
ment of the tax imposed if he makes certain factual determinations. A find-
ing that the taxpayer plans quickly to depart or to remove his property from
the country, to conceal himself or his property within the country, or "to do
any other act tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partially ineffectual
proceedings to collect the income tax,"'22 will result in termination of tax-
payer's year.
Section 6851 can be traced to section 250(g) of the Revenue Act of
1918.23 A taxpayer whose year had been terminated pursuant to section
250(g) was compelled, as was the ordinary taxpayer, first to pay the defi-
ciency determined and assessed by the Service and then bring a suit for re-
fund. In 1924, in order to alleviate the "inherent harshness of the pay first
-litigate later scheme,"'24 Congress established the Board of Tax Appeals, a
forum serving in essentially an advisory capacity, where the taxpayer could
obtain an adjudication of liability before payment of the tax.25  Thereafter,
the Service was required to send a notice of deficiency to all ordinary tax-
payers,2 0 but the notice was not required in those cases where taxpayers'
years had been terminated 27 nor where the assessment or collection of the
deficiency would be jeopardized by delay. 28 The Revenue Act of 1926 ex-
panded the jurisdiction of the Board of Tax Appeals and gave the ordinary
and jeopardy taxpayer the option of forums to determine his tax liability,29 a
procedure carried forward to the present tax structure.30  The 1926 Act,
however, did not expressly give the termination taxpayer31 the right to a pre-
payment redetermination of his liability in the Board of Tax Appeals.3 2
Section 6851 provides only one of the safeguards available to the jeopardy
taxpayer, a stay of enforcement proceedings upon taxpayer's furnishing a
22. Id. § 6851(a) (1). The collection process is set in motion by the district direc-
tor's determination under the § 6851 criteria that a taxpayer's year should be terminated.
The taxable year is then formally declared terminated and a return is prepared for the
abbreviated period by the Service. On the return, the district director reconstructs the
taxpayer's income for the abbreviated period and estimates a tax thereon. An assess-
ment of the tax is made and notice is mailed to the taxpayer. The notice demands im-
mediate payment of the tax. Upon the taxpayer's failure to pay the tax the Service will
seek to satisfy the liability by sale of the taxpayer's property. See Comment, Code Sec-
tion 6851-"Termination of Taxable Year'-Application and Function Within the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 381, 382 (1974).
23. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(g), 40 Stat. 1084.
24. Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (D. Md. 1969).
25. See note 70 infra.
26. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(a), 43 Stat. 297.
27. Id. § 282, 43 Stat. 302.
28. Id. § 274(d), 43 Stat. 297.
29. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 274(a), 44 Stat. 55.
30. See notes 5-13 supra and accompanying text,
31. The term "termination taxpayer" is used herein to mean the taxpayer whose
year has been terminated pursuant to § 6851.
32. Section 274(a) of the 1926 Act, dealing with the issuance of the notice of de-
ficiency, listed five exceptions to the general requirement of notice. Section 6851's
predecessor, § 285, was not listed among the exceptions. This omission leads to the in-
ference that Congress intended the notice requirement to apply in the termination case.
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bond.83 Further, there is no express requirement that a notice of deficiency
be issued upon termination of the taxpayer's year. Finally, unlike section
6861, section 6851 has no express assessment authority, intrinsically or ex-
trinsically.34 Until recently, section 6851 was seldom used by the Service and
consequently presented only a limited opportunity for judicial review. 35 How-
ever, litigation on the subject has mushroomed in the last five years with the
Service's alleged use of the section as a 'tool to control illicit narcotics and
gambling activity.3 6
II. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
The controversy in the recent section 6851 termination cases has been
whether the taxpayer has the right to petition the Tax Court for a prepay-
ment redetermination of the tax liability computed in the first instance by
the district director. This question has turned on whether the taxpayer is
statutorily entitled to receive a notice of deficiency from the Service.3 7
Three circuits have passed on the issue of whether a taxpayer, after a
section 6851 termination, may petitition the Tax Court for a redetermination
of his tax liability.33 The Sixth Circuit has reasoned that because of the
nexus between section 6851 and section 6861 the formal notice requirement
of the latter is applicable to the former; thus the Service must issue a defi-
ciency notice in section 6851 cases.39 The Second and Seventh Circuits
have concluded that the Service need not issue a notice of deficiency in the
section 6851 termination case, and consequently access to the Tax Court is
denied. 40
33. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6851(e).
34. Section 6851 does not mention the term "assessment" nor does it link the section
with any other assessment authority. Further, no section of the Code expressly grants
assessment authority in the termination case.
35. The only significant cases decided under § 6851 or its predecessors before 1967
were Rinieri v. Scanlon, 254 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Puritan Church-The
Church of America v. Commissioner, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 485 (1951), af 'd per
curiam, 209 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954); and Ludwig
Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938).
36. See note 90 infra.
37. See note 6 supra. Generally, there is no question but that the taxpayer has
actual notice, in that he is aware that some action is being taken by the Service against
him or his property. The Service mails notice of the imposed tax to the taxpayer and
demands its payment. However, notice in this context means the formal notice of defi-
ciency issued pursuant to § 6212(a).
38. Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 39
(1974) (No. 73-1808); Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir.), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct. 40 (1974) (No. 74-75); Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir.
1974); Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973); Williamson v. United States, 31
Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1971).
39. Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 40(1974) (No. 74-75); Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1974).
40. Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 39
(1974) (No. 73-1808); Irving v. Gray, 479 'F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973); Williamson v.
United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1971). The Seventh Circuit was
the first appellate court to decide the deficiency notice issue. In Williamson the Service
had terminated plaintiff's taxable year pursuant to § 6851 and seized a sum of money
from his safety deposit box after his arrest for illegally selling narcotics. The court con-
cluded that the deficiency notice was not required in § 6851 cases. It was determined
that what was assessed was not a "deficiency" as defined in § 6211 since no return had
been filed at the date of assessment. The court also noted that § 6851, not § 6861,
provided the assessment authority.
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The most frequently cited case requiring the notice of deficiency is Schreck
v. United States.41  In that case, the taxpayer, after a termination of his
taxable year, brought suit in the district court seeking to have his property,
which had been seized by the Service, returned to him on the ground that
no deficiency notice had been issued. The Government contended that no-
tice was not required. It argued that, by the repeated reenactment of sec-
tion 6851's predecessors without change during the period from 1918 to
1926, Congress intended to leave the Service with an assessment authority
independent of other Code sections. According to the Government's posi-
tion there were three sections granting assessment authority: section 6201
in the ordinary case, section 6861 in the jeopardy case, and section 6851 in
the termination case. Finally, no notice was required because section 6851
failed to provide such a safeguard.
In rejecting this argument, the court noted that, under the Revenue Act of
1918, assessments in termination cases were to be made under the general
assessment section of the Code. 42 However, the court found that the assess-
ment authority for termination cases was shifted to the jeopardy section with
the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1926 which provided for prepayment
suits and the notice requirement. 43  Consequently, the procedural safe-
guards, including notice, of the jeopardy section were available to the termi-
nation taxpayer. The Government also contended that the termination of
taxpayer's year did not result in a statutory deficiency because a deficiency
could not arise until the close of taxpayer's full tax year.44 Further, sec-
tion 6861 could not apply in the termination case since it applied only to de-
ficiencies. The court found, however, that the termination of taxpayer's
period created a deficiency.45 Finding that the Service had failed to com-
ply with the notice requirement, the court granted the injunctive relief re-
quested.
Confronted with a fact situation similar to that of Schreck, the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Rambo v. United States46 unanimously affirmed the district court's
grant of an injunction prohibiting the Service from selling taxpayer's seized
property. The court rejected the Government's contention that section 6201
provided the assessment authority for section 6851, and followed the Schreck
rationale, finding the source of assessment authority in termination cases to
be section 6861. The Sixth Circuit also declined to follow the Govern-
ment's reasoning that no deficiency could exist in the absence of a tax re-
turn filed by the taxpayer. 47 Having placed the assessment authority in sec-
41. 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969), afj'd on rehearing, 375 F. Supp. 742 (1973),
appeal docketed, No. 74-1566, 4th Cir., May 16, 1974.
42. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
43. 301 F. Supp. at 1272.
44. See note 6 supra.
45. The court resorted to the 1926 Treasury Regulations in determining that a stat-
utory deficiency in fact was created by the termination of taxpayer's year. 301 F. Supp.
at 1274-75.
46. 492 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1974).
47. Relying on the Treasury Regulations the court determined that the taxpayer
need not file a return in order for a deficiency to exist. Treas. Reg. § 301.6211-1(a)
(1971) provides in part: "If no return is made, or if the return ...does not show
any tax, for the purpose of the definition 'the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer
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tion 6861 and having determined that a statutory deficiency existed, the
court concluded that the taxpayer had been denied the procedural safe-
guards provided by section 6861, most notably the mandatory notice of de-
ficiency. The district court's grant of injunctive relief was consequently af-
firmed. 48
The leading authority for the Internal Revenue Service's view 'that no no-
tice of deficiency is required under section 6851 is the Second Circuit's de-
cision in Irving v. Gray49 involving the infamous Howard Hughes biography
hoax. As the Irvings' scheme began to crumble, the Service became fearful
that they would flee the country without paying their income tax. Accord-
ingly, the Service terminated the couple's taxable year, declared the tax as-
sessed to be immediately due and payable, and thereupon served a notice of
levy on their brokerage account. The Second Circuit agreed with Schreck
that section 6851 was not the proper source of assessment authority but dis-
agreed that section 6861 necessarily furnished that authority since 'the for-
mer section existed prior to the latter. Instead, the court deemed the assess-
ment authority to be in the general assessment provision, section 6201.10
The court also considered 'the Schreck conclusion requiring notice to be
based on the erroneous determination that a deficiency had been determined
and assessed. A deficiency, by definition, is the amount by which the "tax
imposed" exceeds the amount shown on -the return.51 The appellate court
determined that no deficiency existed in this instance since the assessment
was not of an imposed tax, "but merely an amount which ,he I.R.S. believed
justified the termination of the taxable year."'52 Concluding that notice was
not required, the court effectively stripped the taxpayers of their Tax Court
option, leaving them only an action for refund in the district court. The
plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief was denied because such course of ac-
tion provided an adequate remedy at law.53
upon his return' shall be considered as zero. Accordingly, in any such case . . . the
deficiency is the amount of tax imposed by [the Code]."
48. The Sixth Circuit subsequently reaffirmed its holding in Rambo without addi-
tional comment. Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S.
Ct. 40 (1974) (No. 74-75).
49. 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973).
50. Although the Second Circuit held that the assessment authority for § 6851 was
in § 6201, the court went on to say that it was in accord in this respect with the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Williamson v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 800 (7th Cir.
1971). The Seventh Circuit, however, had determined that the source of assessment au-
thority was in § 6851. The Seventh Circuit had stated: "[The deficiency notice re-
quirement cannot be read into § 6851 because the assessment made under the section
is not a deficiency as defined in § 6211." 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 800 [emphasis
added]. The result is that the Second Circuit, by relying on Williamson, contradicted
itself in determining the source of assessment authority. It is interesting to note that
the Service subsequently changed its position on the source of the assessment authority
and adopted the Second Circuit's view. This may be in part due to that court's favorable
response and in part due to the absence of any reference to assessment authority in §
6851.
51. See note 6 supra.
52. 479 F.2d at 24.
53. The Second Circuit upheld its position in Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853
(2d Cir. 1974). Plaintiff subsequently appealed and certiorari was granted, oral argu-




III. CLARK V. CAMPBELL
Despite its most recent setback in Rambo, the Government relied on sub-
stantially the same arguments in Clark v. Campbell.54  It first contended
that section 6861 could not be the basis of authority for assessment in sec-
tion 6851 cases because section 6861 permitted only assessments of a defi-
ciency. The Service's argument was that a deficiency, by definition, could
not exist absent a return showing a lesser amount of tax than that imposed. 5
Further, section 6851 fails to mention the term "deficiency," providing only
for a termination of the 'taxable period upon the requisite finding of the dis-
trict director. 56 Thus, according to the Government's view, a section 6851
termination does not result in a deficiency but rather a provisional state-
ment of the amount which must be presently paid as a protection against
the impossibility of collection.
Following the Rambo rationale, the Fifth Circuit determined that a de-
ficiency might exist in the absence of the filing of a return. This conclusion
was supported by the Treasury Regulations under section 6211 which pro-
vide that if the taxpayer fails to make a return then it will be considered
that the taxpayer determined that he had no tax liability and the deficiency
will be the amount of the tax imposed by the Service. 57 Additionally, the
court deemed the liability created by section 6851 to be sufficiently analo-
gous to the liability of the ordinary taxpayer at the close of his taxable pe-
riod, thus bringing the section 6851 liability within the Code's definition of
deficiency. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit necessarily rejected the Second
Circuit's conclusion in Irving that no deficiency existed in favor of a more ex-
pansive reading of the term as supported by the Regulations. 9
The Source of Assessment. Determination of the basis for the assessment au-
thority in termination cases was critical. The Fifth Circuit noted that "if
assessment of the section 6851 tax due is indeed grounded sufficiently in
section 6861 it would be impossible to avoid the conclusion that the defi-
ciency notice procedure so carefully prescribed in section 6861 is likewise
applicable to section 6851."60 The Government's assessment argument posed
two significant obstacles to such a finding. First, (the Code provided an ap-
54. 501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit on the same day decided
Aguilar v. United States, 501 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1974). In Aguilar plaintiff's truck
was searched by local authorities and $11,270 in cash was uncovered. Suspecting that
plaintiff was involved in illicit narcotics activity the Service terminated his taxable year
and assessed a tax of $12,774. The liability was satisfied from the cash and proceeds
amounting to $750 from the sale of the truck, which had been seized by customs agents.
When the Service refused to issue a notice of deficiency or to disclose its basis for deter-
mining the assessment, plaintiff instituted suit in district court seeking to enjoin the as-
sessment and to recover the cash seized and proceeds from the sale of the truck. The
district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to § 7421. Aguilar v.
United States, 359 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Tex. 1973). On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed,
holding that appellant was entitled to the notice based on Clark.
55. See note 6 supra.
56. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
57. See note 47 supra.
58. See note 6 supra.
59. See note 47 supra.
60. 501 F.2d at 120.
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pealing general assessment authority, section 6201, and secondly, the pred-
ecessors of section 6851 predated those of section 6861.
The court found the Schreck determination convincing and held that the
authority must be found in section 6861 for three reasons. First the court
noted that sections 6851 and 6861 are "analogous," 61 "equally potent and
similarly oriented provisions"62 and both appear in the subchapter of the
Code entitled "Jeopardy." To treat these two sections in a dissimilar man-
ner, requiring notice in the section 6861 case and denying it under section
6851, would be unsound statutory construction in "complete derogation of
the obvious and carefully considered pattern of the Code."' 3 An attempt
to bypass section 6861, the only jeopardy assessment authority, in favor of
section 6201, would be a convoluted and strained interpretation. Secondly,
the court observed that section 6201 is the assessment authority for taxes
which generally are paid without contest and hence there was no compelling
need for a forum to adjudicate prepayment redeterminations. Once a dispute
arises in ithe case of the non-jeopardy taxpayer, the Code requires the no-
tice of deficiency and an opportunity to litigate the matter before payment
much the same as in the section 6861 case. Although the notice in the lat-
ter case issues after the assessment, prepayment relief is provided by suit in
the Tax Court. Finally, Chief Judge Brown, who delivered the opinion of
the court, feared that an interpretation finding the assessment authority to
be under section 6201 would allow the Service to circumvent section 6861 in
favor of section 6851. Thus, by using section 6851 in all cases, the Service
could effectively deprive the taxpayer of his right to a prepayment rede-
termination in section 6861 as well as section 6851 situations.
In Campbell, as in previous termination cases, the Government pressed
the argument that section 6861 could not be the assessment authority for
termination cases because the original version of section 6851 predated
section 6861's predecessor provision by six years.6 4 Thus, if section 6861
was the source of assessment authority, as the taxpayer -argued, there would
have been no power to assess in a termination case during the six years
before the jeopardy provision was enacted. Chief Judge Brown disposed of
this contention, specifically adopting the determination in Schreck that al-
though the Service originally relied upon the general assessment section for
authority in such cases, the changes brought about by the Revenue Act of
1926 shifted the assessment authority to section 279(ia), section 6861's pred-
ecessor.
6 5
The Right to Prepayment Litigation. The Fifth Circuit was apparently in-
fluenced by several non-statutory considerations in its decision to provide
the section 6851 taxpayer with a forum for a prepayment redetermination
61. Id. at 121.
62. Id.
63. id.
64. See notes 16, 23 supra and accompanying text.
65. The court stated: "[Tihe evolution of our revenue system from an unintegrated
collection of separate revenue acts through two careful codifications, may well create




of his tax liability. These considerations included the strong intent of Con-
gress to provide such a forum, 66 the inadequacy of post-payment review,67
the lack of prejudice to the Government's interest,68 and the awesome effect
of the termination provision. 69 Chief Judge Brown noted that Congress
long ago realized the need for a procedure whereby all itaxpayers could con-
test the Government's determination of their tax liability before payment of
the tax. The necessity gave rise to the creation of the Board of Tax Ap-
peals in 1926 and the right to petition the Board whether the tax arose pur-
suant to an ordinary deficiency or jeopardy assessment.
The Fifth Circuit also noted that to preclude the taxpayer from suing for
a redetermination in the Tax Court would relegate him to suit in the fed-
eral district court after full payment of the tax.70 This remedy would re-
quire the taxpayer to wait six months before instituting suit71 and would
probably involve the contemporaneous seizure and sale of the taxpayer's
assets to provide funds to pay the tax.7 2 As an additional policy consid-
eration, the court failed ,to perceive how the Government's interest would be
prejudiced by allowing the taxpayer to petition the Tax Court before pay-
ment. As Chief Judge Brown stated, "[T]he opportunity for prompt re-
view will hardly dry up the sources of revenue or stop the Government in its
tracks since virtually all other taxpayers who desire to contest income tax li-
ability prior to payment are allowed to do so.'' 73
The court was impressed with the power which section 6851 affords the
Service.74  A close examination of the Code disclosed that the only pro-
cedural relief provided, over which the taxpayer has control, is in the form
of an action to stay ,any proceeding to enforce the tax.75 Such action, how-
ever, is conditioned on the posting of a sufficient bond.76  The court took ju-
66. Id. at 122-23.
67. Id. at 124-25.
68. Id. at 126.
69. Id. at 122-24.
70. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt.
2) CuM. BULL. 246-47:
The right of appeal after payment of the tax is an incomplete remedy,
and does little to remove the hardship occasioned by an incorrect assess-
ment. The payment of a large additional tax on income received several
years previous and which may have, since its receipt, been either wiped
out by subsequent losses, invested in nonliquid assets, or spent, sometimes
forces taxpayers into bankruptcy, and often causes great financial hard-
ship and sacrifice. These results are not remedied by permitting the tax-
payer to sue for the recovery of the tax after this payment. He is entitled
to an appeal and to a determination of his liability for the tax prior to
its payment.
71. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6532.
72. The court stated: "[Tlhe IRS may levy on the taxpayer's property without
applying the property seized to the tax liability assessed or the property seized may not
cover the full amount of the assessment." 501 F.2d at 125. The court further noted
that in either event the taxpayer may be barred from his postpayment remedy because
he had not fully paid his tax liability before instituting suit, citing Flora v. United States,
362 U.S. 145 (1960). If, in fact, the Service is permitted to seize the taxpayer's
property without applying such to mitigate his tax liability, as the Fifth Circuit
stated, serious fifth amendment problems would be presented.
73. 501 F.2d at 126.
74. The court termed the power "awesome," 501 F.2d at 122, and "summary," id.,
with the effect on the "victim," id. at 110, described as "disastrous," id. at 126.
75. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6851(e).
76. Id.
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dicial notice that a substantial portion of the taxpayer's assets usually have
been frozen by the Service's seizure and as a result, the section 6851 tax-
payer is rarely financially capable of procuring the bond. Consequently the
Fifth Circuit viewed this relief as illusory. The remaining statutory protec-
tion, including the Service's option to abate the assessment if excessive or
if jeopardy does not exist,77 was deemed to be too discretionary to be of any
value to the -taxpayer. By discounting the value of these procedural safe-
guards found to be available to the section 6851 taxpayer, the Clark court
essentially designated the notice of deficiency and subsequent access to a
reasonably speedy and effective forum for a prepayment redetermination
of his tax liability as the salient safeguard for the jeopardy taxpayer. The
court concluded that Congress must therefore have intended this valuable
protection be available to the termination taxpayer.78
The correctness of the court's statutory and historical analysis on the
notice issue may be subject to doubt. Section 6851 and section 6861 take
different postures within the statutory framework; the former is a somewhat
independent provision 79 while the latter is integrated with the remainder of
the Code.80 The Code leaves undeveloped the termination taxpayer's pro-
cedural safeguards, including notice, while it clearly provides the jeopardy
taxpayer with procedural protection and, in particular, notice. It is this
amorphous nature of section 6851 that has created the difficult problems of
interpretation. Further, the legislative history of the two sections does not
lend itself to a satisfactory analysis of congressional intent. Although the
Fifth Circuit attempted to link the two sections together, they have distinct
origins' and there is no clear indication of a legislative tie. The best that
could be done with this complicated problem was to draw inferences from
Congress' actions in the formative stages of the statutory framework.8 2
The inferences drawn by the court are not necessarily wrong but may be
suspect.
The Fifth Circuit's non-statutory considerations seem to provide a better
approach to solving the complexities of the problem in the face of the statu-
tory stalemate. It is clear that Congress intended to create a prepayment
77. Id. §§ 6861(c), (g). Although the court assumed that these safeguards were
available to the taxpayer whose year has been terminated, it is doubtful whether they
would be available if the assessment authority in such cases was outside of § 6861.
78. The court expressly declined to comment on the constitutionality of the statute
on due process grounds. This may be due in part to the federal judiciary's reluctance
to decide cases upon constitutional grounds if there exist other bases upon which a de-
cision may be substantiated. The recent case of Lewis v. Sandler, 498 F.2d 395 (4th
Cir. 1974), along with Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969), dis-
cussed supra at notes 41-45, are the authoritative sources for due process discussion.
79. See, e.g., note 34 supra and accompanying text.
80. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
81. See text accompanying notes 16, 23 supra.
82. See Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1271-72 (D. Md. 1969):
There is certainly logic in each of the conflicting inferences which the
plaintiff and the Government draw from the chronology of legislation
during the 1918-1926 period. Unfortunately, neither the research of
counsel nor of this Court has uncovered any legislative history which
compels a solution of this problem. Thus, in the main, there are avail-
able only the limited inferences which can be drawn from the four corners
of the statute books themselves.
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forum and it is also clear that this forum was created as a consequence of the
failure of the district court procedure io handle satisfactorily the problems
created by postpayment litigation. 8  The primary question is whether Con-
gress intended to permit the termination taxpayer access to the Tax Court.
Again there is an absence of clear congressional intent but the factors con-
sidered by Congress to be compelling in the creation of such a forum are
documented8 4 and are certainly as applicable to the termination taxpayer as
they are to the ordinary or jeopardy taxpayer.8 5
The decision to allow the termination taxpayer to petition the Tax Court
would not appear to prejudice any governmental or public interest. Con-
gress created significant safeguards to protect the taxpayer's and the Gov-
ernment's interest in jeopardy cases. Thus, if the safeguards of section
6861 protecting both ,the taxpayer and the Government attach in the termi-
nation case, it would seem that there would be no unusual prejudice to the
Government's position."0 The court's observations relating to 'the power that
section 6851 vests in the district director lends further support to its holding.
The mere existence of the power would not ipso facto warrant judicial ac-
tion, but as the Fifth Circuit noted, the statute on its face fails to provide
any effective protection to the taxpayer.8 7  Consequently, there is appar-
ently no boundary to the Service's power, a result which Congress surely did
not intend. The court's incorporation of the safeguards of section 6861
into section 6851 seems to be a pragmatic response to this virtually un-
checked power.In attaching this protection to section 6851 the court man-
ages to give effect to a strong congressional intent to provide a prepayment
forum without prejudice to any governmental interest.
83. See note 70 supra.
84. Id.
85. Although the termination taxpayer faces essentially the same problems of the
ordinary and jeopardy taxpayer discussed in note 70 supra, there may have been an im-
plied congressional intent to distinguish the two sections. In Ludwig Littauer & Co. v.
Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840, 842 (1938), the Board made such a distinction stating:
Since section 146, subdivision (a) [now § 6851], presupposes a more
exigent situation of jeopardy than that covered by section 273 [now §
6861]-a situation so critical as to require immediate protective action
rather than to await the close of the normal taxable year and the deter-
mination of a statutory deficiency-it can not be supposed that Congress
intended to be more lenient, by permitting the taxpayer to avoid pay-
ment during litigation, than under the less perilous circumstances denoted
by the jeopardy assessment of section 273 [§ 6861].86. If indeed the grant of the § 6861 safeguards to the termination taxpayer would
leave the Government's interest in termination cases as secure as it is in § 6861 cases,
one might wonder why the Government is pressing such a vigorous defense in the termi-
nation cases. There does not appear to be any strong administrative reason to deny the
termination taxpayer the notice. Further, there apparently are no special considerations
related to § 6851, not involved in § 6861, which would prejudice a governmental inter-
est. One explanation of the Government's intensive defense in these cases has been sug-
gested. This is the Government's interest in using the statute against a taxpayer who
is suspected of involvement in illicit narcotics activity. See Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d
108, 110 (5th Cir. 1974) (describing the § 6851 mechanism as an "effective tool in the
relentless struggle against the traffic in drugs"). See also Aguilar v. United States, 501
F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1974); Willits v. Richardson, 497 F.2d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 1974)(criticizing the Service's use of § 6851 "not as [a] tax collection device but as [a] sum-
mary punishment to supplement or complement regular criminal procedures").
87. See notes 79, 81 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Fifth Circuit's extensive statutory analysis in Clark is well
reasoned, it is not totally convincing. The decision undertakes to draw an
inference of congressional intent to intertwine ,two Code sections from a stat-
utory maze and early tax act amendments. An equally strong inference is
that Congress, by completely isolating section 6851 and omitting any provi-
sion for notice therefrom, intended to deny the termination taxpayer access
to the Tax Court. The most significant portion of the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion deals with the equities evident in the court's extra-statutory consider-
ations. Given the balance of statutory inferences which may be drawn,
these considerations would seem to tip the scales in favor of notice.
The Supreme Court has recently agreed to decide the notice issue.88 Thus,
in addition to its controlling effect in the Fifth Circuit, the Clark decision may
also influence the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue. Based solely on
a statutory analysis there is significant authority to support whichever read-
ing the Court decides to give the Code. Hopefully the Court will not con-
fine its decision -to a purely statutory determination but will give strong con-
sideration to Chief Judge Brown's carefully reasoned discussion in Clark of
the extra-statutory factors involved.
Ben Admire
The Recognition of Gain in Property Settlements Pursuant
to Divorce-Wiles v. Commissioner
In anticipation of their divorce, the Kansas petitioner and his wife
negotiated a property settlement which was subsequently incorporated in the
divorce decree." The agreement provided for an equal division of property
acquired during coverture regardless of title ownership. To effectuate the
equal division of their holdings, petitioner transferred to his wife corporate
securities owned by him having an assigned value 2 of $550,000. The Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue assessed a deficiency 3 on the grounds that the
88. Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 39(1974) (No. 73-1808); Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct. 40 (1974) (No. 74-75).
1. Kansas law requires upon divorce an equitable division of property of the mar-
riage, regardless of legal title, either by decree or private agreement. KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1610(b) (Supp. 1973). Such division made by voluntary agreement is subject tojudicial supervision for fairness. Id. § 60-1610.
2. To achieve this equal division of property, the parties agreed to assign values
to the securities which had no readily ascertainable fair market value, particularly the
shares of the family-owned corporations. The parties stipulated that the value of the
regularly traded securities would be the average of the market high and low thereof from
January 1, 1966 through May 21, 1966.
3. The petitioner's basis in the securities transferred was slightly over $83,100,
thereby creating a recognized gain of $467,000. The Commissioner assessed a defi-
ciency in the amount of $109,650.54.
1974] NOTES 1073
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
transaction was a taxable event resulting in a gain from the exchange of prop-
erty under sections 1001 and 1002 of the Internal Revenue Code.4  Peti-
tioner contended that the transfer was not a taxable exchange but rather a
mere division of property between co-owners. The Tax Court ruled in favor
of the Commissioner' and the petitioner appealed. Held affirmed: Under
pertinent Kansas statutes and decisions, the wife has no vested co-ownership
in the property of her husband during marriage, and consequently, the trans-
fer of some of that property pursuant to a divorce settlement constitutes a
taxable event. Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974).
I. TAXATION OF PROPERTY TRANSFERRED IN EXCHANGE FOR
MARITAL RIGHTS OF SPOUSE IN HUSBAND'S PROPERTY
The law has long been settled in community property states that an equal
division of marital property represents nothing more than a division between
co-owners, and hence, is not a taxable event.6 The wife has a present, ves-
ted, one-half interest equal to that of her husband in the property of the mari-
tal community.7 When the one-half interest of the wife is set apart to her
in a separation or settlement agreement, she receives nothing more than that
which was hers already, and consequently, there is no transfer of a taxable
nature.8
In common-law jurisdictions the tax consequences of property settlement
agreements have created a great deal of confusion among lawyers drafting
such agreements. 9 Until 1962 the courts in these jurisdictions were divided
on the issue of whether the taxpayer must recognize a gain as a result of
a property transfer pursuant to a settlement agreement. 10 The Supreme
Court in United States v. Davis1 resolved the dispute by recognizing that
the state law which determined the substantive property rights of the parties
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001 (a) provides in part: "The gain from the sale
or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom
over the adjusted basis . . . and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis ...
over the amount realized." Id. § 1002 provides in pertinent part, as follows: "lOin
the sale or exchange of property the entire amount of the gain or loss, determined under
section 1001, shall be recognized."
5. Wiles v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 56 (1973).
6. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 71 (1962).
7. Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
8. Cofield v. Koehler, 207 F. Supp. 73 (D. Kan. 1962); Davenport v. Commis-
sioner, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 856, 859 (1953); Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718,
719 (1935). But see Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947), holding
that if one spouse receives more than one-half of the community property and the other
receives less than one-half plus separate property of the first spouse there has been a
sale of property and a taxable event. Accord, Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125
(9th Cir. 1943); Edwards v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 65 (1954).
9. For a detailed analysis of the tax implications and consequences of divorce prop-
erty settlements, see Ducanto, Negotiating and Drafting Property Settlements in the Re-
flected Light of the Davis and Lester Cases, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 717 (1970); Note,
Property Transfer Pursuant to Divorce-Taxable Event?, 17 STAN. L. REV. 478 (1965).
10. Compare Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
695 (1941) (transfer of property in satisfaction of wife's support claims taxable event
to husband), and Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 741 (1943) (transfer of property for release of wife's marital rights taxable
event to husband), with Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960) (an agreement that husband give up any interest he had in
an option in exchange for release of wife's marital rights not taxable event to husband).
11. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
1074 [Vol. 28
during marriage would control the characterization of the transfer for federal
tax purposes. Thus, whether the transfer of property between spouses
resulted in a taxable event was held to depend upon whether the state law
considered the spouses to be co-owners of the property.
In Davis a Delaware taxpayer, pursuant to a property settlement agree-
ment, transferred to his former wife appreciated corporate securities which
were solely his property subject to certain inchoate marital rights of the wife,
including a right of intestate succession and a right upon divorce to a reason-
able share of the husband's property. The Court concluded that under
Delaware law the inchoate marital rights of the wife did not reach the dignity
of co-ownership, but rather were more appropriately categorized as a per-
sonal liability of the husband. 1 2 Accordingly, the Court held that the transfer
of appreciated property to satisfy that debt resulted in a taxable event and
that the husband recognized a taxable gain to the extent that the fair market
value of the appreciated property exceeded its basis.' 3
The Davis rule, though succinct in its reasoning, is not without shortcom-
ings in its application in common-law jurisdictions. Most illustrative of this
deficiency is Collins v. Commissioner,'4 where an Oklahoma taxpayer trans-
ferred stock to his wife pursuant to a settlement agreement similar to that
in Davis. The Tenth Circuit recognized that under Davis the state law must
be consulted to determine the nature of the disposition for tax purposes.15
Accordingly, the court affirmed' 6 the Tax Court's holding17 that the appli-
cable statute' s did not vest in the wife any interest in the property of the
husband prior to divorce. However, this statute19 shortly thereafter received
a contrary construction by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Collins v. Okla-
homa Tax Commission.20 The Oklahoma Supreme Court analogized the
vested interest afforded the wife under the statute in property jointly acquired
during marriage as "similar in conception to community property of commun-
12. Id. at 70.
13. See note 3 supra. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(b) provides: "The amount
realized from the sale or other disposition of the property shall be the sum of any money
received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received." The
Court, confronted with the difficulty of attaching a value to the marital rights given up
by the wife, assumed that the parties were bargaining at arm's length and that, absent
evidence to the contrary, the marital rights were equal in value to the property for which
they were exchanged. Other courts have applied this assumption when the value of the
property received is difficult to ascertain but the value of the property released is deter-
minable. See United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960); Phila-
delphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189, (Ct. CI. 1964).
14. 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
15. Collins v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353, 355 (10th Cir.), rev'd, 393 U.S. 215
(1968).
16. Id. at 353.
17. Collins v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 461 (1966), alf'd, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir.),
remanded, 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
18. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961) provides in part:
As to such property, whether real or personal, as shall have been acquired
by the parties jointly during their marriage, whether the title thereto be in
either or both of said parties, the court shall make such division between
the parties respectively as may appear just and reasonable by a division of
the property in kind, or by setting the same apart to one of the parties,
and requiring the other thereof to pay such sum as may be just and proper
to effect a fair and just division thereof.
19. Id.
20. 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
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ity property states,"' 2I and thus the wife could be regarded as a co-owner of
the property. Following this decision, the United States Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and remanded the case for recon-
sideration.2 2 The Tenth Circuit correspondingly reversed the decision of the
Tax Court, and held that the transfer was a non-taxable division of property
between co-owners. 23 The difficulty of application of the Davis rule, as dis-
played by the circuitous litigation in Collins, is now compounded by the
court's opinion in Wiles.
II. WILES V. COMMISSIONER
The underpinnings of the Wiles opinion lie in the Tenth Circuit's strict ap-
plication of the Davis rule requiring consultation of state law to ascertain
whether the transfer necessitated by divorce is in recognition of property
rights or whether it is to obtain a release of an independent obligation.24 The
domestic relations law of Kansas, 25 which is almost identical to that of Okla-
homa, 26 requires that an equitable division of property accompany a decree
of divorce. However, the court in Wiles, antithetical to its final decision in
Collins, concluded that this statutory requirement failed to vest in the wife
an interest in the property of the husband during coverture. The court recog-
nized that under Kansas law a wife has a right to intestate succession if she
survives her husband2 7 and that she is also entitled to one-half of all her de-
ceased husband's realty, the sale of which she did not consent to during mar-
riage.2 8  But the court nevertheless placed considerable emphasis on a
decision by the Supreme Court of Kansas 29 which recognized that although
these rights possess some of the elements of a property interest, they rise no
higher than inchoate rights contingent upon the wife's survival.
The Tenth Circuit misinterprets Kansas law. The concept of a Kansas
wife's property interest in a divorce proceeding was explained by the Kansas
Supreme Court in the leading case of Putman v. Putman,30 where the court
recognized that "[a] wife has certain rights and interests in property acquired
by the husband during the existence of the marriage relation which . . . the
courts upon proper occasion will recognize and protect."'31 The court stated,
"If their marital partnership-for the joint accumulations of property by a
21. Id. at 295.
22. Collins v. Commissioner, 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
23. Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
24. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 71 (1962).
25. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b) (Supp. 1973) provides:
(b) Division of property. The decree shall divide the real and personal
property of the parties, whether owned by either spouse prior to marriage,
acquired by either spouse in his or her own right after marriage, or ac-
quired by their joint efforts, in a just and reasonable manner, either by a
division of the property in kind, or by setting the same or a part thereof
over to one of the spouses and requiring either to pay such sum as may bejust and proper. ...
26. See note 18 supra.
27. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-504 (1964).
28. Id. § 59-505.
29. In re Williams Estate, 158 Kan. 734, 150 P.2d 336, 338 (1944). See also
Bates v. State Savings Bank, 136 Kan. 767, 18 P.2d 143, 145 (1933); Murray v. Mur-
ray, 102 Kan. 184, 170 P. 393, 394 (1918).
30. 104 Kan. 47, 177 P. 838 (1919).
31. 177 P. at 840.
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husband and wife are slightly analogous to that of a partnership-is wrecked
by marital discord . . . , the court may equitably divide the property
accumulated during the marriage relation. 8a2 In Garver v. Garver3 the
Kansas Supreme Court distinguished between alimony and a division of prop-
erty, and concluded that the doctrine of alimony is based on the common
law obligation of a husband to support his wife, while a division of property,
on the other hand, has for its basis the wife's right to an equitable share of
that property which has been accumulated by the joint efforts of the parties
during marriage. These and other Kansas decisions 4 describing the wife's
interest in marital property are clearly indicative of co-ownership during mar-
riage which would allow a non-taxable division of property upon divorce.
The court's interpretation of the Kansas law can be criticized on yet
another ground. The Oklahoma statute85 interpreted by the Tenth Circuit
in Collins was adopted from the law of Kansas. In Vanderslice v.
Vanderslice36 the Oklahoma Supreme Court, interpreting the Oklahoma stat-
ute, stated, "Our statute, section 1278, was adopted from the State of Kan-
sas. The decisions of the Supreme Court of that state are therefore peculiarly
persuasive in this jurisdiction, the statutory provision being the same."'37 The
statutes of Oklahoma and Kansas requiring division of marital property were
identical until 1964, when Kansas amended its statute to subject the wife's
separate property to division by the court as jointly acquired property.88
This amendment, however, does not affect the concept of co-ownership be-
tween spouses of marital property. The similarities of these statutes were
further noted in the court's first opinion in Collins.39 Thus, the court in Wiles
could have easily applied simple syllogistic reasoning in deciding the case.
Recognizing that the wife has a vested interest in the husband's property in
Oklahoma, and that the applicable Oklahoma and Kansas statutes are, for
all practical purposes, identical, then it would logically follow that the wife
should have a vested interest in the husband's property in Kansas. However,
the Tenth Circuit in Wiles chose to confine itself to Kansas statutes and cases,
refusing to attach any significance to the highly analogous case of Collins.
This self-restriction to Kansas law represents a contrary approach to that
adopted by the court in its first decision in Collins.
In its first decision in Collins the Tenth Circuit analogized the applicable
Colorado statute40 to that of Oklahoma,41 and failing to discern any distinction
32. Id. at 841.
33. 184 Kan. 145, 334 P.2d 408 (1959).
34. See Zeller v. Zeller, 195 Kan. 452, 407 P.2d 478 (1965), and Perkins v. Per-
kins, 154 Kan. 73, 114 P.2d 804 (1941), where property was set apart to the wife even
though the court refused to grant her a divorce. See also Cummings v. Cummings, 138
Kan. 359, 26 P.2d 440 (1933), where the court stated, "The law of this state recognizes
that a wife has an interest in property accumulated by husband and wife while the mar-
riage relation existed."
35. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961).
36. 195 Okla. 496, 159 P.2d 560 (1945).
37. 159 P.2d at 562.
38. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b) (Supp. 1973) with OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1278 (1961). See notes 18, 25 supra.
39. 388 F.2d at 357.
40. COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-5 (1963).
41. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961).
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between the two, it readily adopted its earlier opinion of Pulliam v. Commis-
sioner42 as controlling. The court stated, "It is difficult for us -to see any dis-
tinction between Oklahoma and Colorado law sufficient to justify a different
characterization of the property division. '' 43  In Pulliam the Tenth Circuit,
in the absence of a controlling state court adjudication, interpreted the appli-
cable Colorado law, holding that the wife's interest in the property of her
husband did not vest prior to divorce, and therefore, the transfer was a tax-
able event to the husband.
In light of !the court's holding in Pulliam, contra -to its final holding in
Collins, one could argue that the Tenth Circuit in Wiles could have
analogized Kansas law with its interpretation of the law of Colorado, and
thereby adopted Pulliam as controlling. However, the case of Imel v. United
States,44 decided by the United States District Court in Colorado, strongly
suggests that the Pulliam decision is no longer representative of the law of
Colorado. In Imel the Colorado taxpayer transferred appreciated property
pursuant to a divorce settlement similar to that in Wiles, Collins, and Davis.
The district court certified to the Supreme Court of Colorado the question
whether the transfer was a recognition of a "species of common ownership"
of the marital estate resembling a division of property between co-owners,
and upon receiving an affirmative response, held that the transfer was not
a taxable event .4  The court also placed considerable emphasis on Collins,
recognizing that the Tenth Circuit in its first opinion in Collins failed to find
any substantive differences between Oklahoma and Colorado law. Thus
the court concluded, "[E]ven with Pulliam v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in mind, I think that Davis and Collins, when coupled with the
Colorado Supreme Court's answers to the certified questions, mandate that
judgment here enter in favor of the plaintiff .... -46 Thus Collins and Imel
illustrate not only that the Tenth Circuit has searched outside the state in
interpreting state law, but also that other federal courts have considered this
to be proper procedure.
HI. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit in Wiles, absent a Kansas decision directly on point,
42. 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964).
43. 388 F.2d at 357.
44. 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974).
45, The District Court invoked rule 21.1 of the Colorado Revised Statutes which
allows the Supreme Court of Colorado to answer questions of law certified to it by a
federal court when the questions of law before the certifying court may be determinative
of the pending action, and it appears to the certifying court that there is no controlling
precedent in the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court. CoLo. APP. R. 21.1(a).
Similar certification statutes have been enacted in other states, including Florida, FLA.
APP. R. 4.61; Hawaii, HAwAII REV. STAT. § 602-36 (1968); Maine, ME. Civ. PROC. R.
76B; Montana, MONT. SUP. CT. R. 1; New Hampshire, N.H. APP. R. 21; and Washing-
ton, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.60.010-.030 (Supp. 1973). For thorough discussions
of certification procedure, see Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate
Courts to the Florida Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U.
MrAMI L. REV. 413 (1962); Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The
Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1959); McKusick, Certification:
A Procedure for Cooperation Between State and Federal Courts, 16 MAINE L. REV.
33 (1964). See also 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACnCE AND PRO-
cEDuRE § 64 (C. Wright ed. 1961); C. WRrGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (1970).
46. 375 F. Supp. at 1118.
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could have adopted Collins for controlling precedent, thereby holding that a
Kansas wife has a present, vested interest in the property of her husband dur-
ing coverture, and thus a division of marital property pursuant to a decree
of divorce would not result in a taxable event. By its strict and seemingly
unwarranted construction of Davis, the court has undoubtedly invited
circuitous litigation similar to that in Collins. In light of the evident difficulty
of application of the Davis rule, combined with the inherent disparity in tax
consequences between common-law and community property states,47 a ques-
tion necessarily arises as to whether the recognition of gain in property trans-
fers should hinge on the state-created rights of the wife.48  Wiles illustrates
that the tax consequences of such property transfers can turn on subtle statu-
tory verbiage, in contradiction to Congress' long-pronounced general policy
of equality of taxation. If the courts are unwilling or unable to provide con-
sistent application of federal taxation statutes, then legislative reform is
clearly necessitated. Perhaps the decision in Wiles will provide the impetus
for such action.
Don C. Stephenson
47. In Davis the Court noted that in community property jurisdictions an equal divi-
sion of community property is a division among co-owners and thus not taxable, but it
did not consider itself compelled to equate the tax consequences of such property trans-
fers in common-law jurisdictions with those in community property jurisdictions, in view
of the substantive differences between the systems. The Court, obviously dodging the
issue, said, "To be sure Congress has seen fit to alleviate this disparity in many areas
• . . but in many areas the facts of life are still with us." United States v. Davis, 370
U.S. 65,71 (1962).
48. For thorough discussions concerning the effect of state law in federal taxation,
see Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799 (1943); Fried, External
Pressures on Internal Revenue: The Effect of State Court Adjudications in Tax Litiga-
tion, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 647 (1967); Oliver, The Nature of the Compulsive Effect of
State Law in Federal Tax Proceedings, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 638 (1953); Stephens & Free-
land, The Role of Local Law and Local Adjudications in Federal Tax Controversies,
46 MINN. L. REV. 223 (1961).
1974] NOTES 1079
